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How many things did you not do today? The answer to that question is
infinite. I, for instance, did not eat pasta this morning, I did not drive a
car, I did not leave my house through the window, and I did not buy an
airplane. Of course, I could go on and on and on and on. When there is
such an abundance of inactions in everyday li fe it seems almost silly to
try to study them and it seems more efficient to study actions instead.
However, many inactions have important consequences, such as
hindering good decision making. For example, there are two different
systems to register organ donors. In one system, people are automatically
non-donors and have to explicitly indicate to become one (opt-in), in the
other people are automatically donors and have to explicitly indicate not
to become one (opt-out). In countries with opt-in situations (e.g.,
Belgium, Poland and Sweden) much more people choose to become an
organ donor than in countries with an opt-out system (such as The
Netherlands, U.S.A. and Germany; Johnson & Goldstein, 2003; see also
Ritov & Baron, 1992; Spranca, Minsk, & Baron, 1991). Another example
of inactions hindering good decision making,  is that people consistently
choose to do nothing when the number of choices are so overwhelming,
they cannot figure out what they want anymore (Iyengar & Lepper, 2000;
Schwartz, 2000).  Thus, the consequences of people's inactions can
become very important at the individual, but also at the societal level.
Interestingly, people sometimes even choose not to act on
opportunities that are objectively attractive. For example, why would
somebody booking a flight refrain from signing up for air miles without
costs when they get 4,500 miles (half a free flying ticket) extra for free?
There are people who do. These are people who found out they could
'
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6   Chapter I
have had 15,500 free miles ifthey had signed up earlier (Tykocinski,
Pittman, & Tuttle, 1995). Options that were available in the past, but not
anymore in the present are shown to largely drive people not to act.
This effect, of people not acting on attractive opportunities simply
because of missed prior opportunities, is called inaction inertia
(Tykocinski et al., 1995) and is the central theme ofthis dissertation. In
social psychology, the effects  of prior actions that stimulate people to
take action are well known. For example, people are more likely to invest
in a failing course of action, when they invested in that action earlier
(e.g., the costly Dutch railway known as the Betuwelijn; Arkes &
Blumer, 1985). Or, people's willingness to put up a huge sign in their
yard against the building of a local expressway is greater when they
earlier signed a petition against the expressway (Freedman & Fraser,
1966). Inaction inertia is similar, because it also describes that past
decisions influence current decisions, but at the same time it is different,
because it describes that inactions can lead to subsequent inactions.
INACTION INERTIA: WHAT, WHEN, WHO, AND WHY?
What?
66Inaction inertia occurs when bypassing an initial action opportunity has
the effect of decreasing the likelihood that subsequent similar action
opportunities will be taken" (Tykocinski et al., 1995, p. 794). Put
differently, when people miss an opportunity to act, they are less likely to
act on a similar opportunity later. The first experiment investigating this
effect showed that people were less willing to buy a ski pass on discount
from $100 for $90 when they missed the opportunity to buy the pass for
$40 than when they did not miss an opportunity. Thus, because the
initial, more attractive action opportunity is missed (initial inaction), the
second less attractive action opportunity is not taken (inertia). This effect
is stronger, the larger the difference in attractiveness between the missed
and the current opportunity. Thus, likelihood to act on the $90 pass did
not decrease when the opportunity to buy the pass for $80 was missed
(Tykocinski et al., 1995). Usually, inaction inertia is demonstrated by
Introduction 1
showing that people are less likely to act on the current opportunity when
the difference between the missed and the current opportunity is large
than when the difference is small.
When?
The inaction inertia effect is a very robust finding. Researchers found the
effect in various decisions, in scenario studies about buying shoes,
booking vacations, signing up for courses, etc. (Arkes, Kung, & Hutzel,
2002; Butler & Highhouse, 2000; Kumar, 2004; Sevdalis, Harvey, &
Yip, 2006; Tykocinski, Israel, & Pittman, 2004; Tykocinski & Pittman,
1998,2001; Tykocinski et al., 1995; Van Putten, Zeelenberg, & Van
Dijk, 2007; Zeelenberg, Nijstad, Van Putten, & Van Dijk, 2006;
Zeelenberg & Van Putten, 2005), as well as behavioral studies in the lab,
where participants were placed in a gambling situation (Tykocinski et al.,
1995) or a stock market setting (Tykocinski et al., 2004). Put differently,
it seems that any decision is strongly influenced by inactions from the
past and that people  do not seem able to  let go of their past inactions.  But
that would imply that whenever we miss out on an attractive deal, we are
never taking another similar opportunity ever again. With all the sales on
clothing nowadays in Western societies, people are bound to miss a few
good deals sooner or later.  If we take  this to the extreme, it would mean
that in the end nobody will wear anything ever again. How appealing as
this may sound to some people, everyday experience indicates that this is
highly unlikely to happen. I, for example, missed some good deals on
trousers now and then, and still I am wearing one while writing this
dissertation. In other words, there must be constraints on the inaction
inertia effect, boundary conditions that determine when it will emerge
and when not.
Chapter 2 and 3 report the studies that investigated the basic question,
when does inaction inertia occur? The studies in Chapter 2 investigate the
effect of choice context on the inaction inertia effect. Until now inaction
inertia was studied in settings that offered participants one missed
opportunity and subsequently one current option. Based on previous
literature on the influence of the presence of multiple options on decision
making (Hsee & Leclerc, 1998; Jones, Frisch, Yurak, & Kim, 1998), the
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hypothesis was derived that when multiple options are currently offered,
inaction inertia decreases. The reason for this decrease is that the
decision to act or not on the current opportunity might not just be
influenced by the missed opportunity, but rather by a comparison  of the
options available. In short, the experiments demonstrated that inaction
inertia occurs only when the current and missed opportunity are
compared one-to-one.
Chapter 3 turns to the characteristics ofthe decision itself that might
determine whether inaction inertia occurs or not. In previous inaction
inertia studies the missed opportunity was always strongly associated
with the current opportunity. The idea studied in Chapter 3 is that
inaction inertia will occur when this association is very strong, and the
comparison with the missed opportunity is then easy to make. However,
when the missed opportunity is decoupled from the current opportunity
(put differently, when the two opportunities are "segregated"), inaction
inertia might be less likely to set in. Based on the literature on mental
accounting and decoupling (Soman & Gourville, 2001; Thaler, 1999;
Van Dijk & Zeelenberg, 2003), the moderating effect of decoupling on
inaction inertia was investigated. Specifically, the investigation looked at
the influence of factors that decouple the missed from the current
opportunity (e.g., the missed opportunity was less comparable to the
current opportunity) on the inaction inertia effect.
Who,
Inaction inertia has been studied with participants from various cities and
countries. All with their different backgrounds, cultures and personalities.
In these diverse groups, the inaction inertia effect is found over and over
again. This should not be taken as an indication that individual
differences do not matter. For example, when I observe the people
around me, some people are natural 'decouplers', such that they are very
good at segregating disappointing outcomes, or other situations that went
wrong from their current decision. They say things such as: "Ok, that did
not work, how can we make it better?", and have a natural tendency to
look forward. Others, on the other hand, are natural 'linkers'. Such that
they keep wondering about what went wrong, how it could have
Introduction 9
happened, and keep their eyes on the past, and how things might have
been. Based on the question when inaction inertia occurs, and the studies
in Chapter 3 investigating the effect of decoupling on inaction inertia, it
is interesting to see whether this individual difference of dealing with
disappointing outcomes has a similar influence on the inaction inertia
effect. To answer the question who is most likely to show inaction
inertia, Chapter 4 investigated  the in fluence  of this distinction -action
versus state orientation (Kuhl & Beckmann, 1994)- on the inaction
inertia effect. The results showed that the 'linkers' (state-oriented people)
show stronger inaction inertia effects that the 'decouplers' (action-
oriented people), because the linkers used the missed opportunity much
more to estimate the worth  of the current opportunity than the decouplers
did.
Why?
After addressing the questions of what inaction inertia is, when it will
happen and who is most likely to fall prey to it, the more fundamental
question is why this effect happens. What is the psychology underlying
the inaction inertia effect? The literature on inaction inertia is still
inconclusive on what precisely causes the inaction inertia effect. On the
one hand there is evidence in favor of an explanation in terms of regret of
missing the first opportunity. People either want to escape the regret they
feel for missing the first opportunity (Arkes et al., 2002), or stay inactive
to avoid feeling regret in the future (Tykocinski & Pittman, 1998, 2001).
However, recent findings show that regret is not necessarily a causal
factor in the occurrence of the inaction inertia effect and thus cast doubt
on the regret explanations of inaction inertia. (Zeelenberg et al., 2006).
Instead there was more evidence in favor of another explanation of
inaction inertia in terms  of the valuation of the opportunity, which shows
that how much value people place on the choice option depends on the
attractiveness of the missed opportunity (Arkes et al., 2002). According
to the valuation explanation, inaction inertia occurs because the missed
opportunity is used as a reference point compared to which the
opportunity is seen as worth less than it is currently offered for.
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Chapter 5 outlines  a new explanation of inaction inertia.  The
alternative explanation is that devaluation might not be an end, but a
means to cope with the frustration people feel over missing a more
attractive opportunity. According to this so called 'sour grapes
mechanism' (Elster, 1983), if people cannot get what they want, and feel
frustrated over it, a way they might deal with it is by downgrading the
object of frustration. After all,  if you care less about something,  it  is  less
frustrating  if you cannot have it! Applied to inaction inertia, people then
stay inactive on the current opportunity because they downgraded it in
order to alleviate the frustration for missing the more attractive
opportunity. Chapter 5 shows results that inaction inertia decreases when
downgrading is impossible and thus that frustration cannot be alleviated.
Also, the results show that inaction inertia decreases when this sour
grapes mechanism is prevented, or discouraged.
By answering the when, who and why questions of inaction inertia, this
dissertation aims to contributes  to the understanding of the inaction
inertia effect. That is why the question "What is inaction inertia" will be
readdressed in the general discussion with the findings from this
dissertation in mind. When we understand inaction inertia better we can
use this knowledge to enhance its effect to prevent its effects when
inaction is undesirable (e.g., not booking a vacation when taking a break
would be important).
A final note concerns the setup of the individual empirical chapters that
follow. The chapters in this dissertation are based on journal articles. The
downside ofthis structure is that this might cause some overlap in issues
explained or discussed. An upside of this construction  is that it gives
readers a chance to read each chapter separately, without missing crucial
information. I hope this dissertation gives an informative overview and
extension of inaction inertia research up till now, whether you choose to
read it cover to cover,  or just a few chapters.  My aim  is that after reading
it, you understand inaction inertia and have a clear view  of what,  when,
to whom and why it occurs. I invite you to join me on the path 1 chose a




MULTIPLE OPTIONS IN THE PAST AND THE
PRESENT: THE IMPACT ON INACTION INERTIA
How do people decide whether to act on an attractive action opportunity?
If there  is one thing we learned from recent decision making research it is
that people's preferences are not stable, but highly dependent on the
conditions under which such attractive action opportunities are evaluated
(e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 2000). One example ofthis context
dependency is the inaction inertia effect. It shows that missing an
attractive opportunity decreases the likelihood that people will act on a
subsequent opportunity within the same domain (Tykocinski et al.,
1995). For example, people are less likely to book a discounted vacation
to Tuscany for $900 instead of the regular $1000 when they missed a
prior opportunity to book the vacation for $400 than when they missed it
for $800 (Tykocinski & Pittman, 1998). Thus, preferences vary
systematically depending on the comparison with past offers. This
inaction inertia effect is found for numerous decisions, ranging from the
decision to buy a pair of shoes to sign up for a course, and from renting
an apartment to saving airmiles (Arkes et al., 2002; Kumar, 2004;
Sevdalis et al., 2006; Tykocinski et al., 2004; Tykocinski & Pittman,
1998,2001; Tykocinski et al., 1995; Van Putten et al., 2007; Zeelenberg
et al., 2006; Zeelenberg & Van Putten, 2005).
Since the first demonstration (Tykocinski et al., 1995), the insights
into this phenomenon have grown substantially. We now know that
inaction inertia occurs because the missed prior opportunity is used as a
reference point when evaluating the present opportunity. For example,
research has shown that the more attractive the missed opportunity was,
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the more people perceive the current offer as a loss, and the more people
anticipate regret imagining that they would act on this current
opportunity (Tykocinski et al., 2004; Tykocinski & Pittman, 1998,2001;
Tykocinski et al., 1995). Also, the more attractive the missed opportunity
was the more people regret missing it and the more they devalue the
current opportunity (Arkes et al., 2002; Kumar, 2004; Zeelenberg et al.,
2006).  Thus, the comparison of the current opportunity to the missed
opportunity and the difference in attractiveness between the two
opportunities are crucial elements for inaction inertia to occur.
Until now, most inaction inertia studies investigated the effect of
missing a single prior opportunity on the likelihood to act on a single
current opportunity, which is understandable from a research perspective.
In real life, however, action opportunities are usually not offered in such
isolation. In the example of booking a vacation, the trip to Tuscany may
be advertised next to a skiing trip in Aspen, a vacation to see tulips in
Holland, a trip to go diving in Eilat, or a vacation to experience the
mystery of India. Especially now, when the internet allows us to shop
around the world, multiple options are only one click away. Thus, one
could argue that the typical inaction inertia studies represent
oversimplified situations to the participants.
By itself simplification is not necessarily problematic, and in fact
helpful to provide a clear demonstration and understanding of the
phenomenon. However, in the current chapter attention is drawn to the
possibility that the situation in which a single opportunity is missed and a
single opportunity is offered might facilitate the use ofthe missed
opportunity as a reference point, because this is the only reference
information available. Put differently, these oversimplified situations
may be especially conducive to the inaction inertia effect.  If one option  is
missed and one option is offered people naturally focus on the loss
incurred by the missed opportunity (Tykocinski et al., 1995). If
alternative options are present in the current choice set, the temporal
focus of people is likely to shift  to the gains that are still available.
Manipulating the focus from past losses to future gains moderates the
inaction inertia effect (Tykocinski et al., 1995, Exp. 6). In a similar vein,
it is proposed that the availability of multiple options increases people's
tendency to act on the current opportunity.
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Therefore,  in the present research the influence of multiple options on
the occurrence of inaction inertia was studied. The investigation started
in the first two experiments by studying the influence of multiple current
options. In the third experiment the investigation continued by studying
the influence of multiple missed options on inaction inertia.
MULTIPLE CURRENT OPTIONS
To my knowledge, there is only one previous article that investigated
inaction inertia  in the context of multiple options (Zeelenberg &  Van
Putten, 2005). Participants in this research were asked to choose between
eight brands of beer (or four brands of detergent) after they missed a
discount on one of those brands.  They were less likely to opt  for the
formerly discounted brand when there was a large discount, compared to
when there was a small discount. But, at the same time they were more
likely to switch to a brand that they perceived to be more attractive at that
time.  The aim  of that article was to  show that inaction inertia might be
another explanation for the decrease in sales on a brand immediately after
a promotion (i.e. post-promotion dip), and that this may be due to the
switching to other brands. The current research extends this finding, by
showing that multiple current options shift attention from past losses to
present possible gains. As a result, the current options will be compared
to each other instead of to the more attractive missed opprotunity.  This
will lead people to choose the most attractive option in the current choice
set. An important implication of the present research thus  is that people
might not necessarily switch to another option but can also decide to act
on the same option, depending on its attractiveness compared to the other
options in the choice set.
Indirect evidence for this effect of multiple options on the inaction
inertia effect comes from earlier research on the influence of multiple
options on the choice process. Jones and colleagues (Jones et al., 1998)
showed that people weigh attributes of a choice option differently when a
choice is framed as an opportunity (e.g., should I book a vacation to
Tuscany or not), than when it is framed as a choice (e.g., should I book a
vacation to Tuscany, or to Holland, or no vacation). Decision makers
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respond markedly different to opportunities as compared to choices.
Jones et al. (1998, p. 213) argue that this is the case because "people
focus their attention on those aspects of the decision problem which are
explicitly represented, and that they tend to pay less attention to those
aspects  of the problem which are represented only implicitly." Viewed
this way, the typical inaction inertia situation can be interpreted as an
opportunity decision in which the main focus is on the (difference
between) the current and missed opportunity and the perceived loss that
goes with it.  But the introduction of multiple current options may shift
the decision-makers' attention from the missed opportunity to the other
alternatives, which probably put it less in a loss perspective. Thus, the
opportunity to book the trip to Tuscany would be more influenced by the
missed opportunity, than the choice of this trip out of a set that also
includes the alternative options to go to Israel or America. Jones et al.'s
findings may thus substantiate the reasoning that inaction inertia will be
attenuated when there are multiple current options present, because these
alternative options decrease the negative impact of the missed
opportunity  as a point of reference.
This idea is also consistent with the work of Bazerman, Hsee and
their colleagues, who investigated the difference between joint and
separate evaluation (Bazerman, Moore, Tenbrunsel, Wade-Benzoni, &
Blount, 1999; Hsee, Loewenstein, Blount, & Bazerman, 1999).
Especially important for the current research are the insights provided by
Hsee and Leclerc (1998) who suggested that an attractive but unavailable
reference point influences the evaluation of an option more when  it is
evaluated separately than when  it is evaluated jointly with another option.
In one of their studies, participants were presented a scenario in which
they were considering to buy a cordless phone, and learned that a friend
had just bought a phone with a 100 meter reach and a battery that lasts 20
days (this attractive but currently unavailable alternative was the
reference point). One group of participants was asked whether they
would buy a phone with a 50 meter reach and a battery that lasts 2 days
(separate evaluation). Another group of participants was asked whether
they would buy a phone with 20 meters reach and a battery that lasts  10
days (separate evaluation). A third group was offered a choice between
both these two phones (joint evaluation). It was found that participants in
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the separate evaluation conditions were not likely to buy the phone,
probably because it compared unfavorably to the unavailable attractive
reference point. Participants in the joint evaluation condition, however,
were  likely to buy one of the phones, probably because they were  not so
much focused on the unattractive reference point, but also paid attention
to the other option in the choice set. Thus, although reference information
was present in both the joint and separate evaluation conditions, the
impact of this reference information decreased when another option was
present in the current choice context.
These previous findings support the idea that the loss incurred by
missing a prior more attractive opportunity will influence the decision to
act on a current opportunity less when the current opportunity is offered
in a choice set with other options than when it is offered alone. Note that
this implies expecting only a large influence of multiple options when the
difference in attractiveness between the missed and the current
opportunity is large. When the difference in attractiveness is small, and
its  influence on the current decision is small, the influence of multiple
options is expected to be negligible.
EXPERIMENT 2.1
The investigation of Experiment 2.1 studied the influence of the
availability of another current option on the inaction inertia effect. The
reasoning behind this is that an additional option in the choice set would
decrease the weight of the missed opportunity in the decision whether to
act on the current opportunity. As a result, the difference in attractiveness
with the missed opportunity would be less important when another option
is in the choice set than when the current opportunity is offered in
isolation. The hypothesis is therefure that inaction inertia would occur
when the current opportunity is the only option available, but when
another option would be currently available too, inaction inertia would be
attenuated due to a higher likelihood to act on the current opportunity.
Participants read that they were considering buying a sofa, and that
they previously either missed a much more attractive offer (large
difference), or a slightly more attractive offer on a sofa (small
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difference). This was all information in one half ofthe situations (one
current option). In the other situations it was mentioned that another
option was also currently available (two current options). In the one
current option conditions the expectation was that the larger the
difference in attractiveness between the missed and the current
opportunity, the less likely people would act on the current opportunity
(= inaction inertia). However, in the two current options conditions the
expectation was that, because people are less likely to compare the




Hundred-sixty students (40 male, 120 female, Mage = 21 years) at Tilburg
University volunteered to participate in this experiment. They were
randomly assigned to one of the four conditions  of a 2 (Difference  in
attractiveness: large vs. small) x 2 (Current option: one vs. two) between-
participants design.
Procedure and measures
Participants were provided with a questionnaire containing the scenario.
The scenario in the one current option and large [small] difference in
attractiveness condition read as follows:
You would like to have a new sofa. You thought that either a black or
a blue sofa would look nice in your room. In a window of a furniture
shop you recently saw nice black and blue sofas. The black sofa was
offered for €250 [€350] instead of€500. That is why you are eager to
stop by the shop. When you get to the shop it appears that you are too
late and the offer has expired. The sofa is still for sale. A salesperson
tells you the black sofa is now offered for €400 instead of €500.
In the two current options conditions the  last two sentences of the
scenario were changed into "The sofa is still for sale in black and blue.
The blue version is offered for €500. A salesperson tells you the black
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sofa is now offered for €400 instead of €500". After reading the scenario
participants indicated action likelihood for the black sofa on an  11-point
scale ranging from 0 (very unlikely) to 10 (very likely).
Results
The purpose of Experiment 2.1  was to test the hypothesis that likelihood
to act on a choice option after missing a more attractive offer is lower
when the difference between the missed and subsequent options is large
than when this difference is small (i.e., inaction inertia), but that this
decrease in action likelihood disappears when the subsequent offer is
evaluated  in the presence of an alternative current option. The results  of
action likelihood with respect to the black sofa are summarized in Table
2.1.
A 2  x  2 ANOVA yielded a main effect of difference in attractiveness,
17(1,156) =  12.89, p <.001,  and a main effect of current option, F(1,156)
= 20.87, p < .001. These were qualified by a significant interaction effect,
17(1, 156) -4.52, p <.05. Further analyses using simple effects showed
that inaction inertia was found in the one current option condition, F(1,
156)-16.35, p <.001. However, as expected this effect disappeared in
the two current options condition, 17(1, 156) = 1.07, ns.
Discussion
The results show that the size of the difference between the missed and
the current opportunity influences the likelihood to act on the current
opportunity when it is evaluated alone, but not when it is evaluated
together with another current option. Note, that with another option in the
choice set, the likelihood to act increased across conditions to the level of
the likelihood to act with a small difference in attractiveness (and
normally has less negative impact on the likelihood to act on the current
opportunity). This corresponds  to  the  idea that the presence of multiple
current options shifts the temporal focus from the past missed
opportunity to the present available options.
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Table 2.1: Mean and Standard Deviation  of Action Likelihood as a Function of
Current Option and Difference in Attractiveness  in Experiment 2.1
Dijference in attractiveness
Large Small
Current option                M           SD                M           SD
One sofa 4.47a (2.21) 6.52b (2.47)
Two sofas 6.88b (2.47) 7.4Ob (1.87)
Note. Ratings were made on  11-point scales, with endpoints labeled not likely (0) and
very likely (10), means with different subscripts per row differ at p < .001.
Although the current findings support the current reasoning, one
might posit that the findings could also be explained differently. One
could argue that the sofa was purchased more because of a simple
contrast with the other available option. Due to this contrast effect the
current opportunity may have looked better in the conditions with two
options than in the conditions with only the current option. This way, not
only the presence of an alternative option was manipulated, but also
whether the present opportunity by itsel f was seen as more attractive or
not.  Although this could only explain the main effect of the number of
options and not the interaction effect, it would be relevant to control for
this possibility.  The aim of Experiment 2.2 was to replicate the findings
of Experiment 2.1 while controlling for the possible difference in
attractiveness  of the current opportunity between the  one and two options
conditions, providing a different  test of the hypothesis.
EXPERIMENT 2.2
In Experiment 2.2 participants all missed an opportunity to buy a
cordless phone. Next, they were offered a less attractive opportunity to
buy a cordless phone with a large or a small difference in attractiveness
with the missed opportunity. They were either offered one phone, or
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another, or these two phones were offered together. Thus, the same
phones were offered together or separately. The main dependent variable
of interest was the likelihood to act on the subsequent offer. The
hypothesis was that the difference in attractiveness would be important in
the decision to act in the conditions with one current opportunity, but that
this effect would weaken or disappear in the conditions where the two
options are offered together.
Method
Participants and design
Two hundred-ten students (85 male, 114 female, 11 did not indicate their
gender, Mage = 21 years) of Tilburg University volunteered to participate
in this experiment.  They were randomly assigned to one of the six
conditions of a 2 (Difference in attractiveness: large vs.  small)  x  3
(Current option: Phone A, Phone B, Phone A & B) between-participants
design.
Procedure and measures
Participants were provided with a questionnaire containing the scenario
of one of the six conditions. The scenario was a modified version of Hsee
and Leclerc's (1998) cordless phone scenario. The scenario in Phone A
and large [small] difference in attractiveness condition read as follows:
You are looking for a cordless phone for use at home. In a flyer of
Primafoon (a telephone shop) you saw a phone with a  100 [50]
meter reach  and of which the battery lasts  for 20  [10]  days.  You
were interested in this phone.  That is why a couple of days later you
went to the shop. There it turned out that the phone was already
sold out. You briefly talk to a salesperson. He recommends you
another phone that is available. The price is within your budget.
The phone has a reach of 50 meters and the battery lasts for 2 days.
Difference in attractiveness was manipulated the same in the Phone B
and the Phone A&B conditions. In the Phone B and the Phone A&B
condition it was manipulated which phone(s) were currently offered to
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the participants. In the Phone B condition the phone that is currently
considered had a reach of 20 meters and the battery lasts  for  10 days.  In
the conditions with Phone A&B both phones were currently offered
together.
After reading the scenario participants could indicate their likelihood
to act on these alternatives. In the Phone A condition they were asked,
"How likely are you to buy the phone with 50 meters reach and a battery
that lasts for 2 days?" In the Phone B condition the same question was
asked but then for the phone with 20 meters reach and a battery that lasts
for  1 0 days.  In the Phone A & B condition both these two questions were
asked. In addition, a more general question was added in the Phone A &
B condition, namely, "How likely are you to buy one of these phones?"
All action likelihood questions were assessed on 11-point scales (0 =
very unlikely,  10 = very likely). One general measure of action likelihood
was calculated which used the single action likelihood measures in the
Phone A and the Phone B condition and the measure of the likelihood to
buy one of the phones in the Phone A &B condition. This measure was
used to compare action likelihood between the three conditions.
Results
The purpose of Experiment 2.2 was to test the hypothesis that inaction
inertia is replicated for two options when they are evaluated in isolation,
and not when these options are evaluated together. The results of the
action likelihood measure per condition are summarized in Table 2.2.
A 2 x 3 ANOVA on action likelihood yielded a main effect of
difference in attractiveness, 17(1, 204) = 12.14, p < .01, and a main effect
of current option, F(2,204) = 6.16, p < .005. These main effects were
qualified by a significant interaction effect,  F(2,204) = 3.41, p <  .05.
Simple effects nalysis showed a significant difference in action
likelihood between the large and small difference (i.e., inaction inertia) in
the Phone A condition, 17(1,204) = 12.37, p < .001, as well as in the
Phone B condition, F(1,204) = 6.55, p< .05. In the Phone A&B
condition, as predicted, this difference was not significant, F(1, 204) =
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0.002, ns:
Table 2.2. Mean and  Standard  Deviation  of Action  Likelihood  as  a  Function of
Current Option and Difference in Attractiveness in Experiment 2.2
Difference in attractiveness
Large Small
Current option M SD       M     SD
Phone A 2.5la (1.90) 4.63b (2.87)
Phone B 2.94a (2.33) 4.49b (2.50)
Phone A&B 4.94a (2.95) 4.9la (2.39)
Note. Ratings were made on 11-point scales, with endpoints labeled not likely (0) and
very likely (10). action likelihood in the Phone A&B condition indicated the likelihood
to act on one of the phones, means with different subscripts per row differ at p < .001.
Discussion
Inaction inertia was found in both conditions with one current
opportunity, but not in the condition where these two opportunities were
offered together, providing a conceptual replication of Experiment 2.1.
Additionally, unlike in Experiment 2.1, the other available option is this
Experiment was not inferior, ruling out the alternative contrast
explanation that people are more likely to act on the current opportunity
because it looks better next to the other option in the choice set. As a
result, the higher likelihood to act on the current options is due to the
multiplicity of options  and not the favorable contrast with the other
To examine whether, and hopefully preclude that inaction inertia decreases in the Phone A
& B condition simply because the chance that one of the phones is chosen is higher, the
ratings on action likelihood on phone A and on action likelihood on phone B in the Phone A
& B conditions were compared to the ratings on likelihood to act on phone A in the Phone A
condition and on phone B in the Phone B condition. The results show the same pattern as the
results discussed in the main text: The likelihood to act on Phone A and on Phone B both
increase in the Phone A&B conditions. This shows that attenuation of the inaction inertia
effect is not merely due to a higher chance of acting on one ofthe two phones.
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available option. It again supports the reasoning that when multiple
options are offered, the focus on the missed opportunity decreases
leading to a higher likelihood to act.
EXPERIMENT 2.3
Experiments 2.1 and 2.2 showed that inaction inertia is attenuated when
multiple current options are available. The reasoning behind this effect is
that when multiple current options are taken into consideration the focus
shifts from past losses to possible future gains. As a result, likelihood to
act in the large difference conditions is as high as in the small difference
conditions, in which the impact  of the missed opportunity  is less strong.
We can now conclude that multiple current options attenuate inaction
inertia. However, we cannot be entirely sure  if this is really because  of a
shift in focus away from the missed opportunity. Therefore, it was also
tested whether the same reasoning can be applied to reverse the effect
obtained in Experiment 2.1  and 2.2. If multiple current opportunities shift
the focus from past losses to present possible gains, multiple missed
opportunities should increase the focus to the past loss incurred by the
missed opportunity. The loss felt over having missed two opportunities
is likely to be greater than the loss felt over having missed one. Hence,
missing multiple options would lead to inaction even when the difference
in attractiveness is small. In other words, the expectation is again to find
no effect of the difference in attractiveness between the missed  and the
current opportunities, but this time because likelihood to act on the
current opportunity would be low overall.
Along the lines of Experiments 2.1  and 2.2, the experiment was
designed such that each opportunity was missed separately in half of the
conditions or that it was missed in combination with the other
opportunity in the remaining conditions. This experiment was about
deciding to book a vacation to a Greek Island. Participants read that they
had either missed an opportunity to book a trip to the Greek island
Rhodes, or to book a trip to the Greek island Kos, or that they missed
both these opportunities. To replicate the typical single option inaction
inertia studies, participants that only missed the opportunity to book a
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trip to Rhodes [Kos] were subsequently offered a trip to Rhodes [Kos]. In
the conditions in which participants missed both opportunities, they were
subsequently offered either the trip to Rhodes, or the trip to Kos. This
was done in order to adequately test whether the likelihood to act on a
currently offered vacation to Kos or Rhodes was influenced by missing a
single offer for a trip to the same island versus by missing two offers.
The hypothesis was that when multiple opportunities are previously
missed, the effect of difference in attractiveness decreases through the
fact that likelihood to act on the current opportunity is reduced.
Method
Participants and design
Two hundred and forty college students (122 male, 114 female, 4 did not
indicate gender, Mige = 22 years) at Tilburg University volunteered to
participate in this experiment. The design was a 2 (Difference in
attractiveness: large vs. small) x 3 (Missed option: Kos vs. Rhodes vs.
both) x 2 (Current option: Rhodes vs. Kos) between-participants design.
For theoretical reasons the conditions in which Rhodes was missed and
Kos currently offered and Kos missed and Rhodes currently offered were
not tested. Consequently, participants were randomly assigned to one of
the eight remaining conditions.
Procedure and measures
Participants were provided with a questionnaire containing a scenario
with the dependent measures. The scenario in the Kos-Kos and large
[small] difference in attractiveness conditions read as follows:
In your vacation you would like to get away to a sunny place for a
few days. You were thinking about a trip to a Greek Island. When
you pass a travel agency you happen to see an offer for a completely
organized 10-day trip to a Greek Island.  A trip to Kos now offered for
€149 [€199] instead of €299. That is why you are eager to go to the
travel agency. In the following week you have not had time and when
you get to the travel agency the offer has expired. The travel agency
has a new offer: a trip to Kos for €249 instead of €299.
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In the Rhodes-Rhodes condition the initial offer for Rhodes was €199
[€249] instead of€349, and a subsequent offer for Rhodes was €299
instead of€349. Finally, in the remaining two conditions both offers were
missed and subsequently either the trip to Rhodes or to Kos was offered.
Thus, one offer was missed and one was currently offered, or two were
missed and one was currently offered. After reading the scenario
participants in the Kos condition indicated how likely they would book
the trip to Kos, participants in the Rhodes conditions indicated how likely
they would book a trip to Rhodes (0 = very unlikely.  10 = very likely).
Results
The purpose  of the experiment was  to  test the hypothesis that likelihood
to act on a choice option after missing a single more attractive offer was
lower when the difference between the missed and present option was
large than when this difference was small, but that this difference would
decrease when two options were missed, because action likelihood would
be low overall. The means  of the action likelihood ratings are
summarized in Table 2.3.
The design was not full factorial and because not all the cells were
filled the data were analyzed with a 2 x 3 x 2 ANOVA using the Type IV
sum-of-squares method. This analysis yielded a main effect of difference
in attractiveness, F (1,232) = 13.23,p <.001, showing that after missing
a much more attractive offer for either Kos, Rhodes or both people were
less likely to act on the current offer(s) than after missing a slightly more
attractive offer (revealing overall inaction inertia). Additionally, there
was a main effect of missed option, F (2,232) = 6.07, p < .01, showing
that the likelihood to act on the subsequent offer for a trip to Kos and
Rhodes differs depending on whether Rhodes or Kos or both were
missed.
To test the specific prediction that action likelihood would be higher
in the small difference conditions than the large difference conditions,
but only when one option was missed and not when two options were
missed two contrast analyses were ran. The first contrast showed that the
effect of difference in attractiveness was significant  in the Rhodes-
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Rhodes condition, and in the Kos-Kos condition, t(116) = -3.55, p < .01.
Thus, in these conditions, in which one option was missed, inaction
inertia was replicated. The second contrast showed that the effect of
difference in attractiveness was not significant in the both-Rhodes and
both-Kos conditions, t(116) = -1.65, ns. This corresponds to the
reasoning that the inaction inertia effect does not occur when two offers
were missed and one offer was subsequently offered. Additional t-tests
supported the reasoning more: the results showed a higher likelihood to
act when the difference between the missed option was large than when
the difference was small when only Rhodes was missed and currently
offered, t(57) = -3.27, p <.01, and when only Kos was missed and
currently offered, t(59) = -2.40, p < .05. However, there was no such
difference in action likelihood when Both options were missed and
Rhodes was currently offered, t(58) = -0.99, ns, nor when both options
were missed and Kos was currently offered, t(58) = -1.39, ns.
Discussion
The current findings thus corroborated the basic reasoning. First of all,
the manipulation of difference in attractiveness only affected likelihood
to act when one offer was missed and not when multiple offers were
missed. Thus, the effect that is generally seen as being characteristic for
the inaction inertia effect was only apparent in the case of a single missed
opportunity and not with multiple missed opportunities. Secondly, action
likelihood was very low when multiple options were missed, which
supports the notion that with multiple missed opportunities action
likelihood decreases. These findings of Experiment 2.3 complement the
findings of Experiments 2.1  and 2.2, and support the reasoning that
multiple options affect likelihood to act because of a change in focus on
the missed opportunity as a point of reference.
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Table 2.3. Mean and Standard Deviation of Action Likelihood as a Function of
Missed and Current Options and Difference in Attractiveness in Experiment 2.3
Difference in attractiveness
Large Small
Missed-current options M SD       M      SD
Rhodes-Rhodes 4.90a (2.32) 6.57b (1.55)
Kos-Kos 4.03a (2.56) 5.47b (2.91)
Both-Rhodes 3.87a (2.71) 4.57a (2.78)
Both-Kos 3.9Oa (2.02) 4.73a (2.59)
Note. Ratings were made on  11-point scales, with endpoints labeled not likely (0) and
very likely (10), means with different subscripts per row differ atp < .05
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The inaction inertia effect refers to the finding that people are less likely
to act on an attractive opportunity only because they missed a more
attractive opportunity earlier on. The present chapter reports the
investigation  of the effect of the presence of other options  in the current
or missed choice set. Three experiments showed that this availability of
alternatives considerably impacts people's tendency to act. Experiment
2.1 and 2.2 showed that when the current opportunity is presented
together with another option, the likelihood to act on the current
opportunity increases such that inaction inertia is attenuated. Experiment
2.3 showed that when multiple options were missed, the likelihood to act
on the current opportunity decreases, also attenuating inaction inertia.
Based on these findings it is concluded that the presence of multiple
options next to the current opportunity shift the focus away from the
missed opportunity, and, alternatively, that multiple options next to the
missed opportunity increase the focus on the missed opportunity.
Our reasoning about the role of the missed opportunity as reference
point was supported by insights from the literatures on choices vs.
opportunities and the joint vs. separate evaluation. The present findings
showed that this reasoning can be extended to multiple options around
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the reference point. the findings thus not only provide insights into the
effect of multiple options on inaction inertia,  they also support those
previous literatures by replicating them in an inaction inertia context and
by extending the reasoning from multiple options in the present to
multiple options in the past.
The present research extends the finding of Zeelenberg and  Van
Putten (2005) that people switch to other brands than the brand
previously on sale. If multiple options are offered the missed opportunity
has less weight in the decision to act on one of the current opportunities.
If another brand is the most attractive choice option among the current
opportunities that brand is likely to be chosen. However, when the same
brand is the most attractive option in the current choice set people will
not necessarily switch. Instead they will be very likely to choose the
same brand again.
The findings obtained in the present research appear to be relevant for
other sequential decision making phenomena as well. The sunk cost
effect, as an example, shows that decision makers are more likely to
invest in a project when they already invested in it before (Arkes &
Blumer, 1985). Indeed, Neal and Northcraft (1986) found that the sunk
cost effect decreased by letting participants actively generate alternative
courses of action than the currently failing course of action. Based on the
current findings and previous findings on multiple options one might
explain this finding by the effect of multiple options, which might have
decreased the impact of the previous investments.
In conclusion, the influence of missed opportunities on subsequent
decisions clearly depends on the size of choice set with which the
decision maker is confronted. The availability of multiple options  can
both enhance and attenuate the impact of the missed opportunity  on the
decision to act on the current opportunity. After having missed a large set
of attractive opportunities, we become extra inert, resulting in a failure to
seize the moment and act on currently offered attractive opportunities.
However, a multitude of options offered in the present, may reduce the
tendency to dwell on the past and may help to seize the attractive
opportunities of today. These findings  are not only insightful with respect
to the occurrence of inaction inertia in externally valid situations, but also
reassuring with respect to our susceptibility to fall prey to this bias.
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When?
DECOUPLING THE PAST FROM THE PRESENT
ATTENUATES INACTION INERTIA
Decisions are hardly ever made in a vacuum. On the contrary, they often
follow on previous decisions within the same domain. Ample research
has shown that this sequential element of our day-to-day decision making
has implications for how and what we decide. Thus, behavioral decision
making cannot be understood if one only looks  at the options under
current consideration and not at the temporal embedment of most
decisions. A well-known fact is that decisions in the past often promote
similar decisions in the present. For example, as shown by 'the foot-in-
the-door-effect' (Freedman & Fraser, 1966), a decision to honor a large
request is much more likely when the decision maker previously honored
a smaller request within the same domain. The notion that previous
decisions to act influence our current decisions to act is also present in
the sunk cost effect, which describes the tendency "to continue an
Nendeavor once an investment in money, effort, or time has been made
(Arkes & Blumer, 1985, p. 124). Interestingly, effects ofpast decisions
on current decisions are also found for past decisions not to act. People
are less likely to act on a 10% discounted offer because they did not act
on a 50% discounted offer. This specific finding is referred to as inaction
inertia (Tykocinski et al., 1995).
"Inaction inertia occurs when bypassing an initial action opportunity
has the effect of decreasing the likelihood that subsequent similar action
opportunities will be taken" (Tykocinski et al., 1995, p. 794). For
example, participants who failed to purchase a ski pass for $40 were less
likely to purchase the $90 ski pass than those who failed to buy the $80
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ski pass (Tykocinski et al., 1995, p. 794). Thus, because the initial, more
attractive action opportunity is missed (initial inaction), the second less
attractive action opportunity is not taken (inertia). This basic finding has
been replicated numerous times in many different choice-situations
(Arkes et al., 2002; Butler & Highhouse, 2000; Kumar, 2004; Sevdalis et
al., 2006; Tykocinski et al., 2004; Tykocinski & Pittman, 1998,2001;
Tykocinski et al., 1995; Zeelenberg et al., 2006; Zeelenberg & Van
Putten, 2005). Put differently, one may conclude that inaction inertia is a
very robust effect.
In the present research this assumed robustness was investigated in a
series of three experiments. The investigation was prompted by questions
such as: Does inaction inertia mean that every time we miss out on a
good deal we stay inactive on subsequently offered deals? Are we always
prisoners of our missed opportunities in the sense that we never let go of
them? When we miss out on highly discounted underwear, will we
refrain from buying underwear for the rest of our lives? This is probably
not the case. There are probably limits to the inaction inertia effect;
boundary conditions under which it will occur. But what then determines
that we stay inactive after one inaction but get relatively quickly over
another? To answer these questions let's turn to the literatures on mental
accounting and transaction decoupling.
MENTAL ACCOUNTING AND TRANSACTION DECOUPLING
One of the core findings  in the mental accounting literature  is that events
(i.e., decisions, outcomes, experiences, etc.) tend to exert the most
influence on subsequent events when they are placed within the same
mental account (Thaler, 1985,1999). Events may differ in the degree to
which  they are processed as parts  of the same account or not (Bonini  &
Rumiati, 2002; Henderson & Peterson, 1992). For example, people are
less likely to buy a new theater ticket after having lost their theater ticket
earlier than after having lost an equivalent amount of money (Kahneman
& Tversky,  1984). The explanation for this finding is that the loss of the
theater ticket is seen as part of the same mental account (e.g., for
attending the theatre), while the loss of an equivalent amount of money is
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seen as part of a different mental account (e.g., for various spending
during the day). Consequently, the loss of the theatre ticket weighs
heavier on the decision to buy a new one than the loss of the equivalent
amount of money.  On a more general level this implies that events that
are placed within the same mental account exert more influence on each
other than events that are placed into separate accounts.
The more two transaction opportunities are seen as relating to the
same mental account, the more they are seen as "coupled" to each other
"(Prelec & Loewenstein, 1998). The literature on "transaction decoupling
has shown that coupling factors in economic transactions can have a
profuund influence on decision making (Gourville & Soman, 1998;
Soman & Gourville, 2001; Van Dijk & Zeelenberg, 2003). For example,
the decision whether or not to go skiing on a particular day under bad
weather conditions is more influenced by the price people paid when
people bought a one-day ski pass than when they bought a four-day ski
pass (Soman & Gourville, 2001). When the costs of one day skiing is
clear and has a one-to-one connection to the benefit of one day skiing, it
is more tightly coupled to the decision to go skiing than when the cost is
more ambiguous and has a less clear one-to-one connection. Soman and
Gourville (2001, p. 31) hypothesized and showed that "This ambiguity
should result in a dissociation or "decoupling" of the cost and the benefit
of one day skiing, leading to a weaker attention to sunk costs and a
relatively low likelihood of skiing in the poor conditions". These
counterfactual decisions get less attention when they are decoupled from
the current decision. This is consistent with the research on thinking and
memory that indicates that concrete information is easier to consider,
process, and remember (e.g., Reyes, Thompson, & Bower, 1980;
Sherman, Cialdini, Schwartzman, & Reynolds, 1985). Thus, similar to
having two events being booked to separate mental accounts, decoupled
factors tend to exert less influence on each other.
In general, both the mental accounting and the transaction decoupling
literature imply that the extent to which a previous event will affect the
evaluation  of a subsequent event depends  on the strength of their
association. This does not imply that for two events to affect each other
they necessarily have to be placed  in the same account.  If two
opportunities end up in the same mental account, a vague standard will
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also make a comparison process much more difficult. Rather, when both
events relate to the same mental account or when they are otherwise
tightly coupled, they will exert a stronger influence on each other than
when they relate to separate accounts or when they are only loosely
coupled.
Now, how does this relate to inaction inertia? In inaction inertia
situations people are less likely to act on an attractive opportunity
because they missed a more attractive opportunity before. From the
inaction inertia literature we can conclude that this occurs because
inaction inertia requires a comparison of the current opportunity to a past.
The occurrence of the inaction inertia effect requires the perception that a
real opportunity existed, and one must be able to imagine taking
advantage  of this previous opportunity (e.g., Tykocinski & Pittman,
1998,2001). Based on these basic findings it is suggested that a crucial
factor for inaction inertia to occur is the fact that the current opportunity
has to be tightly coupled to the past opportunity. Consequently,
manipulations that reduce the tight coupling should weaken the influence
of the past opportunity resulting  in an attenuation of the inaction inertia
effect. Therefore, the goal of the present research is to investigate
whether tight coupling of the past and the current opportunity is
necessary for inaction inertia to occur.
To obtain first insight in these boundary conditions, it is instructive to
closely read the scenarios used to study inaction inertia. In typical
inaction inertia situations the missed and the current opportunity are
presented as highly related, and hence tightly coupled to each other. For
example, in the Ski pass scenario the missed and the current opportunity
are both about a ski pass in Ski Liberty. In other scenarios both
opportunities concerned buying a pair of shoes (Arkes et al., 2002) or
both opportunities concerned booking a vacation with the same
destination (Tykocinski & Pittman, 1998,2001; Zeelenberg et al., 2006).
Again, another scenario described an opportunity to follow a course after
being too late to register for the same course at an earlier time
(Tykocinski & Pittman, 2001). These examples already show that the
past and the current opportunity are typically highly comparable and
highly related to each other. This comparability might be one reason why
these opportunities are tightly coupled.
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Other reasons why the past and the present opportunity might be
tightly coupled in inaction inertia are suggested by the mental accounting
and decoupling literatures. For example, previous research has shown
that payments with credit card typically reduce the coupling between
payment and purchase, especially when compared to payments with cash
and checks (Prelec & Simester, 2001). According to Thaler (1999) a
decoupling characteristics of credit card payments  is that because  of the
time between the two events of payment and purchase the payment is not
only later than the purchase, but also seen as more separated from it.
Time is indeed a well-known example of increasing the perceived
psychological distance between two events (e.g., Trope & Liberman,
2003). The closer an event was to happen, in time or otherwise, the more
it  is associated to related decisions and to judgments of probabilities and
negativity of related events. Thus, another way two related events  seem
to become less tightly coupled is by increasing the psychological distance
between them. Inaction inertia research has already shown that time
attenuates the inaction inertia effect (Tykocinski & Pittman, 2001;
Zeelenberg et al., 2006). This thus provides first support for the
prediction that increasing the distance between the missed and the current
opportunity decreases the inaction inertia effect. However, time is but
one factor that increases distance. Moreover, in this previous research the
attenuated inaction inertia effect could not be related to decoupling, since
this was not measured. It does indicate that psychological closeness in
typical inaction inertia situations might be a second reason why the
missed and the current opportunity might be tightly coupled.
Thaler (1999) also suggests that when a payment of a product is part
of a bigger bill the costs  of that product are taken  less into account in the
purchase decision. As described earlier, Soman and Gourville (2001)
indeed showed that the costs and benefits of one day skiing are less
tightly coupled to each other when they are part of the costs of a four-day
skiing pass, because the costs of one day skiing are then unclear or
ambiguous. Thus, another way in which two related events become less
tightly coupled is when there is ambiguity concerning information about
that relationship. In typical inaction inertia situations information about
the difference in attractiveness is always very clear. For example, the
price of the missed opportunity (e.g., Tykocinski et al., 1995), or the
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quality of the teacher of the course you cannot register to anymore
(Tykocinski & Pittman, 2001) is always described explicitly in the
scenario that the participants read. This clear and unambiguous nature of
information might be a third reason why the two opportunities might be
tightly coupled to each other.
OVERVIEW OF THE CURRENT RESEARCH
In the present research the influence of these three coupling factors on
the occurrence of inaction inertia was tested. The hypothesis was that a
factor that attenuates the tight coupling (specifically through
manipulations of ambiguity of information, psychological distance and
comparability) between the past and the present opportunity attenuates
the inaction inertia effect.
In Experiment 3.1 the focus was on the ambiguity of information.
The results show that inaction inertia occurred when there was clear
information about the missed opportunity, but that it disappeared when
this information was ambiguous. Experiment 3.2 focused on how close
the missed opportunity was in terms of the sequence of decisions that
was required to obtain it. When an extra decision would have been
required to obtain the more attractive missed opportunity inaction inertia
decreased. Finally, Experiment 3.3 focused on the comparability between
the missed and current opportunity, and found that the less comparable
the missed and the current opportunities were the less inaction inertia
occurred.
EXPERIMENT 3.1: AMBIGUOUS INFORMATION ABOUT THE
MISSED OPPORTUNITY
In the typical inaction inertia study the information that determines
the attractiveness  of the missed opportunity is clear and unambiguously
stated. In real life, however, we may not always know exactly how
attractive previous opportunities were. People can be aware of the fact
that they missed an attractive action opportunity, but do not know, or
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forgot, the exact degree of attractiveness. For example,  in real life it can
be clear that the teacher of the missed course was better, but it is often
not exactly clear how much better, or in which domain. Or it can be clear
that the ski pass that is now offered for $90 has been offered for less
previously, but a person is not sure, or forgot whether it was offered for
$40 or $80. This effect of ambiguous information on inaction inertia,
however, has not yet been studied.
For the current purpose the effects of ambiguity were addressed,
because it can be seen as a typical decoupling factor.  The idea of an
ambiguous event weakening the attention to this event returns in the
literature on the disjunction effect, which shows that consequences  of an
event are taken more into consideration  when the outcome  of this event  is
certain than when it is ambiguous (Shafir & Tversky, 1992; Tversky &
Shafir, 1992). For example, when deciding to accept or reject a second
gamble, people took information about the outcome of a first gamble into
consideration when this information was certain. The majority of people
accepted a second gamble when the first gamble was won and also when
a first gamble was lost. However, when it was unclear whether the first
gamble was won or lost the majority of people decided to reject the
second gamble.  In  fact, the percentage of people accepting the second
gamble in this disjunctive condition was similar to that ofpeople that did
not play a prior gamble. Thus, people in this disjunctive condition acted
similarly as people that did not play a prior gamble at all. These are
remarkable findings. Why would people not opt for a second gamble
when it was uncertain whether they won or lost, whereas they would be
willing to continue if they won and also  when they lost?  The
interpretation offered by Tversky and Shafir (1992, p. 308) is that:
"Instead, not knowing whether they have won or lost the first gamble,
people segregate the second gamble and evaluate it from their current
position". In other words, people do not base their current decision on
ambiguous information and that decisions that are surrounded by
uncertainty are not coupled to a current decision.
In agreement with these insights, the suggestion is that ambiguous
information may decrease the inaction inertia effect when information
about the missed opportunity is ambiguous. This is also based upon
findings by Van Dijk and Zeelenberg (2003) concerning effects of
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ambiguity of information on decision making in sunk cost situations.
Their studies show that most people decide to continue a project once
either certain high (€1,500,000) or low (€500,000) costs are already
made, but that people are more likely to terminate the project when the
costs made were ambiguous (€500,000, or €1,500,000, or any amount in
between), or when no previous costs were made before. In accordance
with Tversky and Shafir (1992), Van Dijk and Zeelenberg argue that
ambiguous information has this decoupling effect because ambiguous
information is discarded as a reason to base a decision on. This
discarding of information can be either motivationally driven, that is,
people opportunistically interpret the ambiguous information such that it
serves their current goals best, or this discarding of information happens
because people find the ambiguous information cognitively too difficult
to process (Soman & Gourville, 2001). Both possibilities lead to the same
conclusion that current decisions will be more affected by prior outcomes
and decisions when these prior outcomes are certain than when the prior
outcomes are ambiguous. In this latter case, people are more likely to act
similar to a situation in which no information about prior outcomes
would be available at all.
The present experiment drew on these insights presented above in
order to understand the boundary conditions of inaction inertia. When
indeed ambiguous information is discounted, the typical inaction inertia
effect should be obtained when information about the missed opportunity
is clear and certain, but not when this information is ambiguous. To test
this hypothesis likelihood to act was compared across four conditions in
which people were deciding about buying a television for €180 instead of
the €200 regular price. In two conditions this current opportunity was
offered after missing the opportunity to buy the television for €100
(Large Difference) or for €165 (Small difference). In the Control
condition no missed opportunity was mentioned. In the Ambiguous
condition the attractiveness  of the missed opportunity was ambiguous.  It
was either €100 or €165, dependent on the flip of a coin. The prediction
is that people in this situation would discard this  info and act as if no
information about the missed opportunity was present, that is, as in the
control condition.
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Method
Participants and design
One hundred twenty students (58 males, 62 females, Mage = 21) at
Utrecht University volunteered to participate in this study. They were
randomly assigned to one of the conditions of a four group design
(Difference in Attractiveness: Large vs. Small vs. Ambiguous vs.
Control).
Procedure and materials
Participants were approached individually at several places on the
University Campus. They were provided with a one-page questionnaire
containing the scenario describing a decision to buy a television. Action
Likelihood was assessed with the following question: "How likely are
you to buy the television for €180?" (0 = not at all likely; 10 -very much
likely). The scenario in the Large [Small] Difference condition read as
follows (translated from the original Dutch):
You want to have a new television for some time now. In an ad of a
local store you saw a nice set. You are interested in the television and
decide to go to the store. When you get there you see that it is offered
for €180 instead of the regular €200.
When you discuss the television with a salesperson, you find out that
the store had special theme last week, the 'Coin festival'. That is why
the television was then offered for €100 [€165] instead of €200.
In the Ambiguous condition, the text after "the store had a special theme
last week, the 'Coin festival"', read:
That is why the television was then offered for either €100, or €165
instead of€200. That is because your discount was determined by the
flip of a coin. Therefore it is unknown how big the offer would have
been.
In the Control condition  the part of the scenario with information about
the missed offer was left out.
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Testing the Material
To test this Ambiguity manipulation a separate experiment was ran in
which 75 different participants (41 men, 34 women, M = 23) wereage
randomly assigned to the three experimental conditions followed by three
questions on how a) related, b) coupled, and c) associated they thought
the missed and the current opportunities were (0 = not at all; 10 = very
much). Together these questions made a reliable scale (a = .89), called
the Coupling Scale. A One-way ANOVA ofthe ratings on the Coupling
Scale on the three conditions showed an effect, F(1, 72) = 5.74, p = .01.
Planned comparison t-tests show that coupling was less in the
Ambiguous condition (M= 4.74, SD =  1.94) than in the Large
Difference condition (M= 6.34, SD = 2.64 ), t(48) =  3.43,p < .01, and
the Small Difference condition (M= 5.52, SD = 2.50), t(48) = 2.09,p <
.05. Coupling did not differ significantly between the Small Difference
and the Large Difference condition, t(48) = -1.31, ns. These results
confirm that indeed the manipulation of ambiguous information had the
predicted decoupling effect.  Let us now turn to the results of Experiment
3.1.
Results
The inaction inertia effect was expected when information about the
attractiveness of the missed opportunity was clear,  but not when this
information was ambiguous. Specifically, the expectation was to find
differences in the likelihood to act on the current opportunity between the
Large and Small Difference conditions. However, in the Ambiguous
condition the expectation was that people take information concerning
the missed opportunity less into account and thus act similar as in the
Control condition. The results confirm these expectations (See Table
3.1).A One-way ANOVA on the Action Likelihood ratings revealed a
significant effect, 17(3,  116) =  17.20, p < .001. Planned comparison t-tests
show that Action Likelihood in the Large Difference condition was lower
compared to the Small Difference condition, t(58) = 3.26, p < .01, the
Control condition, t(58) = -6.84, p < .001, and the Ambiguous condition,
t(58) = -5.00, p <.001. Action Likelihood was also lower in the Small
Difference condition than in the Ambiguous Difference condition, t(58) =
-1.97, p = .05, and than in the Control condition, t(58) = -3.71,p < .001.
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Table 3.1 Mean and Standard Deviation of Action Likelihood as a Function of
Dil»rence in Attractiveness  in Experiment 3.1





Note. Ratings were made on 11-point scales, with endpoints labeled not likely (0) and
very likely (10). Means with different subscripts differ atp < .05.
However, the Ambiguous Difference condition did not differ from the
Control Condition, t(58) = 1.51, ns.
Discussion
The results show that participants fell prey to inaction inertia when they
missed out on a €100 offer, and (but to a lesser extent) when they missed
out on a €165 offer. However, when the missed opportunity was
ambiguous (either €100 or €165), participants acted as  if they had not
missed an offer at all. Note that the average action likelihood in the
ambiguous condition did not fall halfway between the small and large
difference conditions, which would be the prediction of an expected
value model. This finding is intriguing and in perfect agreement with
previous findings on the disjunction effect. It is also consistent with the
current inference that ambiguity may prevent a coupling between the two
action opportunities and hence attenuate the inaction inertia effect.
One might wonder i f it is really ambiguity driving this result? For
instance, what would happen  i f the missed opportunity was a 50% chance
of paying €100 and a 50% chance ofpaying €130? In this case there
would still be ambiguity regarding the attractiveness  of the difference  in
attractiveness, but of course the ambiguity would be reduced, because
both values are now much more attractive than the current €180 offer.
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Two additional conditions of Experiment 3.1  were ran to answer this
question. In these conditions, the television could again be purchased for
€180 instead of the €200 regular price, but in the first condition an offer
for the television of€130 was missed, and in the second condition an
offer of €100 or €130 (again depending on the flip of a coin) was missed.
The results show that the likelihood to act on the €180 offer was again
lower when a €130 offer was missed (M = 4.17, SD = 2.00), than when
the missed offer was either €100 or €130 (M = 5.63, SD = 2.54); t(58) = -
2.49, p < .05, and it did not differ from the other ambiguous condition in
which the missed offer was either €100 or €165, t(58) = 0.83, ns. The
likelihood to act was higher when a €130 offer was missed than when the
€100 was missed, t(58) = 2.05, p < .05. These additional findings thus
show that even with reduced ambiguity with regard to the attractiveness
of the missed opportunity the results of Experiment 3.1 were replicated.
Experiment 3.1 showed that manipulating ambiguity of information
about the attractiveness of the missed opportunity attenuated the inaction
inertia effect. This reveals that the strong association between the missed
opportunity and the current opportunity can be influenced by
characteristics  of the missed opportunity.  the next experiment
investigates decoupling characteristics of the decision path that might
determine the coupling  of the missed opportunity and the current
opportunity.
EXPERIMENT 3.2: ADDITIONAL STEPS BETWEEN THE MISSED
AND THE CURRENT OPPORTUNITY
One may think of the process of decoupling two sequential opportunities
as one of increasing the distance between them (see also Thaler,  1999).
Two factors that are very close to each other are more likely to be tightly
coupled to each other than two factors that are seen as more distant from
each other. For example, people judge a negative outcome more
negatively  if they were  only one  step away from preventing  it
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1982). Likewise, people judge themselves
luckier if they were only one  step  away of a worse outcome (Teigen,
1996). Thus, the closer a missed event was, the more it is coupled to
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events that are successive in evaluation. The same inference can be made
with respect to inaction inertia. In typical inaction inertia situations the
missed opportunity was only one step away in the sense that only one
decision was to be made, namely to go to the store earlier.  But what if the
missed opportunity was two steps  away? What if an extra decision would
have been required to obtain the more attractive opportunity? The
argument is that this increased distance to the missed opportunity leads to
a higher likelihood to act on the current opportunity.
In everyday life one often finds that an extra decision is required for
obtaining attractive discounts. For instance, airline companies often
provide special offers to frequent flyers only. Also, shops frequently only
offer their regular customers (often via customer cards) special discounts.
These are attractive action opportunities that are known to everybody but
only relevant to people that made an extra decision in the sense that they
purchased more items earlier or they made the decision to obtain
customer cards.  If this additional decision increases the psychological
distance to the action opportunity, it may have profound implications for
the occurrence of inaction inertia. This factor, however, has not yet been
studied in inaction inertia research. In the present experiment it was
manipulated whether an extra decision was necessary to get the missed
opportunity and the expectation was that inaction inertia was restricted to
situations where this extra decision is not necessary.
Half of the participants read a typical inaction inertia scenario.  The
other half read essentially the same scenario,  but also learned that in
order to obtain the missed opportunity they should have made one
additional decision, that is, they should have decided to save coupons.
Method
Participants and design
Two hundred students (113 females, 85 males, 2 unknown, Mage = 22) at
Tilburg University volunteered to participate in this study. They were
randomly assigned to one of the five conditions  in a 2 (Difference  in
Attractiveness: Small vs. Large) x 2 (Extra Decision: No vs. Yes) + 1
(Control) between participants design.
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Procedure and materials
Participants were approached at several places on the University
Campus. They were provided with a one-page questionnaire containing
the scenario describing a decision about buying a coffee machine. The
scenario in the Large [Small] Difference condition read as follows
(translated from the original Dutch):
You consider buying a new coffee machine. On the university
campus this week you overheard a conversation, in which somebody
told he had bought the same coffee machine you would like with a
50% [20%] discount and that this discount lasts until next week.
Although you intended to go there, you didn't get to the store in time
and the discount expired. A few days later you walk by the store and
see the same coffee machine with  a 10% discount.
In the Extra Decision conditions it was added that participants found out
that to obtain the missed discount they should have decided to save
coupons. Because they did not decide to save coupons earlier the missed
opportunity was not directly available to them.
Participants in the Control condition only read about the 10% offer
and did not receive information about a missed offer. Action Likelihood
was assessed with the question: "Are you going to buy the coffee
machine with a 10% discount?" (1 = not likely; 1 = very likely).
Testing the Material
Again, the extra step manipulation was tested in a separate experiment.
Eighty different participants (30 men, 50 women, M = 22) wereage
provided with the same stimulus material  as  in the 2  x  2 part of the
design of this experiment, followed by the same Coupling Scale as used
in Experiment 3.1 (a = .91). There was only a main effect of'Extra step'
on the Coupling Scale showing that coupling was higher in the No Extra
Step conditions (M= 6.05, SD = 0.33) than in the Extra Step Conditions
(M= 4.93, SD = 0.33), F(1,76) = 6.01,p < .05. There was no effect on
the Coupling Scale of Difference in Attractiveness, F(1,76) = 0.00, ns,
nor an interaction effect, 17(1, 76) = 0.50, ns. This result confirmed that
the manipulation of an extra step had the predicted decoupling effect. Let
us now turn to the results of Experiment 3.2.
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Results
The first analysis investigated whether inaction inertia occurred when the
missed opportunity required an extra decision or not. For this purpose the
four conditions of the 2  x 2 design were used. In particular, Action
Likelihood should be lower when the difference between the missed and
current opportunity was large than when this was small, but only when
obtaining the missed opportunity did not require an extra decision; this
effect should disappear when an extra decision was necessary to obtain
the more attractive opportunity. The results are summarized in Table 3.2.
A 2 x 2 ANOVA showed a significant main effect for Difference in
Attractiveness, 17(1,156) = 16.48, p < .001, and for Extra Decision, 17(1,
156) = 6.93,p < .001. These results were qualified by a significant
interaction effect, 17(1,156) = 4.03, p <.05. Simple effect tests showed
that the effect of Difference in Attractiveness was significant in the No
Extra Decision condition, F(1,156) =  18.41, p < .001, replicating the
inaction inertia effect, but not in the Extra Decision condition, 17(1, 156)
= 2.10, ns.
Next, the Control condition in which no previous opportunity was
missed was compared to the four experimental conditions. A 5-group
one-way ANOVA on the Action Likelihood ratings yielded a significant
effect, F(4,  195) = 8.94, p < .001. Planned contrast analysis tested the
prediction that only participants in the Large Difference, No Extra Step
condition showed a lower likelihood of acting on the opportunity to buy
the coffee machine, compared to the other four conditions. The results
confirmed this prediction, t(195) = -5.63,p < .001. Thus, only after
people missed a much more attractive opportunity that did not require an
extra decision, likelihood to act on the current opportunity decreased. A
second contrast analysis confirmed the prediction that the Extra Decision
conditions did not differ from the Control condition, t(195) = 1.46, ns.
The decision to act on the present opportunity in the Extra Decision
conditions, both when the difference between the missed opportunity was
large and when  it was small, resembled the decision  to  act as  if there was
no missed opportunity at all.
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Table 3.2.  Mean and  Standard  Deviation  of Action  Likelihood as  a  Function  of
Extra  Step  and  Difference  in  Attractiveness  in  Experiment  3.2
Extra Step
No Yes
Difference in Attractiveness Difference in Attractiveness
Large Small Large Small Control
M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD)
3.28a(1.88) 4.98b(1.80) 4.58b(1.68) 5.15 (1.71) 5.33 b (1.61)
Note. Ratings were made on 7-point scales, with endpoints labeled not likely 0 ) and
very  likely (7). Means with different subscripts differ atp < .05.
Discussion
The results clearly show that when an extra decision was required to
obtain the missed opportunity the inaction inertia effect is less likely to
occur. Moreover, in this situation the decision to act on the current
opportunity resembles the decision to act in the control condition, in
which there was no information about the missed opportunity. These
results are consistent with the reasoning that increased distance in terms
of decision sequence may decouple the past from the present.
Experiment 3.2 showed that an increased distance to obtain the
missed opportunity decreases the inaction inertia effect. Increased
distance can be viewed as a factor that decreases the likelihood of
actually associating the missed to the current opportunity. In the third and
final experiment focused on coupling characteristics  of the association
between the missed and the current opportunity. This experiment was
designed to investigate whether a factor that influences the strength of the
association between the missed and the current opportunity also
influences the occurrence of inaction inertia. Therefore, the next
experiment investigated the influence of comparability of the missed and
the subsequent opportunities on inaction inertia.
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EXPERIMENT 3.3: COMPARABILITY OF THE MISSED AND THE
CURRENT OPPORTUNITY
Until now, in most inaction inertia research the missed and current
options are highly comparable. This might be a reason why the past
opportunity influences the decision about the present opportunity. In
Experiment 3.3 comparability between the missed and the current
opportunity was manipulated and the effects on inaction inertia were
tested. The reasoning behind this was that the more comparable objects
are, the more strongly they are associated with each other and,
consequently the more coupled they are. Studies on mental accounting
have revealed that the stronger two products are related (e.g., sport and
city shoes), the more likely it is that they are placed in one mental
account (Bonini & Rumiati, 2002; see also Kahneman & Tversky, 1984).
Also, these studies showed that the less two objects are related (e.g.,
sport shoes  and a watch), the  more they are evaluated as part of two
different mental accounts. Comparability thus seems to be a coupling
factor. This is consistent with earlier behavioral decision research
showing, for example, that lesser comparability between trading objects
leads to more difficulty in computing gains and losses in the trade (Van
Dijk & Van Knippenberg, 1998).
On the basis  of the above  it was predicted that reduced comparability
of the missed and the current opportunity decreases the influence  of the
missed opportunity on the current opportunity. This willlead to a higher
focus  on the attractiveness  of the current opportunity by itself.  As  a
result, likelihood to act on the current opportunity will resemble
likelihood to act on the opportunity when no opportunity is previously
missed.
Objects are seen as less comparable when they come from different
product categories (Johnson, 1984; Van Dijk & Zeelenberg, 2005). That
is why in the present experiment the product category of the past
opportunity was manipulated. Participants indicated their likelihood of
buying a sofa with a 20% discount. They either missed a previous
opportunity to buy a sofa with a 50% discount (High Comparability), or
they missed a previous opportunity to buy a chair with a 50% discount
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(Low Comparability), or they did not learn about a missed opportunity at
all (Control). The prediction was that, compared to people missing a 50%
discount on another sofa, people who missed a more attractive
opportunity to buy a chair would be more likely to act on the 20%
discount on the sofa. In other words, the prediction was that decreased
comparability would decrease the inaction inertia effect.
Method
Participants and design
Sixty-three students at The Hague University (33 males, 25 females, 5
unknown, Mage = 21) volunteered to participate in this study. They were
randomly assigned to one of the three conditions (High Comparability,
Low Comparability, or Control).
Procedure and materials
Participants were approached individually at several places at the
campus. They were provided with a one-page questionnaire containing
the scenario describing a decision to buy a sofa. The scenario in the High
Comparability [Low Comparability] condition read as follows (translated
from the original Dutch):
You would like to have a chair or sofa for in your room. You have
seen some nice chairs and sofas in a window shop last week.
Although you were interested, you did not get to the store that week.
By the time you get to the store you find out that the sofas [chairs]
had a 50% discount last week. A salesman tells you that the offer on
sofas [chairs] is not valid anymore, but that this week you get a 20%
discount on a sofa.
Participants in the control condition only read about the 20% offer and
not about a missed offer. Action Likelihood was assessed via the
question: "How likely are you to buy the sofa with a 20% discount?" (0 =
absolutely not; 10 = certainly).
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Testing the Material
Again, the comparability manipulation was tested in a separate
experiment. Thirty different participants (14 men, 16 women, Aige-
22)received the stimulus material of one  of the two experimental
conditions  of this experiment followed by the same Coupling Scale  as
used in Experiments 3.1 and 3.2 (a = .83). The results show that coupling
was higher in the High Comparability condition (M= 6.10, SD = 1.85)
than in the Low Comparability condition (M= 5.07, SD = 2.54), t(28) =
2.74, p = .01. This result confirmed that the manipulation of low
comparability had the predicted decoupling results. Let us now turn to
the results of Experiment 3.3.
Results
Inaction inertia was expected when the missed and current opportunities
were comparable, and not when they were less comparable. In particular,
a large difference in Action Likelihood between the control and the high
comparability conditions was expected, and a smaller difference in
Action Likelihood between the Control and the Low Comparability
conditions. The results are summarized in Table 3.3. A One-way
ANOVA showed that the three conditions differed significantly, 17(2, 60)
= 3.45, p < .04. Planned comparison t-tests showed that the likelihood of
action in the High Comparability condition was lower than in the Control
condition, t(41) = -2.59, p < .01, and the Low Comparability condition,
t(40) = -1.62, p = .056. The likelihood of acting on the second
opportunity in the Low Comparability condition and Control condition
did not differ significantly, t(39) = -0.97, ns.
Discussion
The  results of this experiment show that a decreased degree of
comparability decreases the inaction inertia effect. The decision to act on
the current opportunity was influenced more when the missed
opportunity was highly comparable to the current opportunity than when
it was not. This again indicates that the inaction inertia effect decreases,
the  less the current opportunity is evaluated in light of the missed
opportunity, or the less tightly coupled it is to the missed opportunity.
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Table 3.3 Mean and Standard Deviation ofAction Likelihood as a Function of
Comparability in Experiment 3.3





Note. Ratings were made on 11-point scales, with endpoints labeled absolutely not  CO)
and certainly (10). Means with different subscripts differ atp < .05.
*Means in the Low Comparability and Control conditions differ atp < .06.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
This chapter concentrated on a key element in the inaction inertia effect:
the coupling of the past opportunity to the current decision. Prior
research on the inaction inertia effect has more or less treated coupling of
the missed and the current opportunity as a given by focusing on
situations where this was typically the case. By explicitly addressing the
coupling itself, and building on prior theorizing on mental accounting
and transaction decoupling, not only inaction inertia could be
investigated, but also its boundary conditions. More specifically, this
research studied the extent to which coupling of the missed and the
current opportunity affected the occurrence of inaction inertia. Three
experiments revealed that the inaction inertia effect decreased when the
missed and the current opportunity are decoupled from each other.
Experiment 3.1 focused on decoupling characteristics  of the missed
opportunity. The results showed that likelihood to act on the current
opportunity increased when the information about the attractiveness of
the missed opportunity was ambiguous. Experiment 3.2 focused  on
decoupling factors in the decision path that was required to obtain the
missed opportunity. The results showed that likelihood to act on the
current opportunity increased when an extra decision was necessary.
Experiment 3.3 focused on the strength of the association between the
missed and the current opportunity. The results showed that the less the
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missed and the current opportunity were comparable to each other, the
less likely inaction inertia was to occur.
It is interesting to see that the present research found one general
result (decoupling the past from the present attenuates inaction inertia)
brought forward by three different factors. The presence of a coin toss
(Exp. 3.1) manipulated the ambiguity with regard to the attractiveness of
the missed opportunity, whereas whether people should have saved
coupons (Exp. 3.2) or whether people missed a discount on a the same or
another product category (Exp. 3.3) manipulated the closeness and the
comparability of the missed opportunity, independent of the
attractiveness of the missed opportunity. These factors  can be  seen  as
three different factors that share a general consequence, namely they
decouple.
The present focus on the coupling between the past opportunity and
the current decision clearly revealed that there are boundary conditions to
the inaction inertia effect. Earlier studies on inaction inertia could be
interpreted as suggesting that once we miss out on an attractive action
opportunity we will remain inactive on subsequent related opportunities.
The present research, however, shows that we are not always haunted by
past inactivities and that we are not doomed to a state of inertia every
time we miss out on an attractive action opportunity. In fact, the present
research has shown that common factors in daily life prevent this inertia
from setting in. Frequently, highly attractive action opportunities are
framed as special events that cannot be compared with normal action
opportunities, or that are not equally close to everybody. Also,
information about attractive opportunities can often be unclear. Either
you know that there was a very attractive action opportunity, but cannot
exactly remember what it was, or shops give the information that they
offer discounts up to 50%. The present studies indicate that under these
conditions inaction inertia is not likely to occur and that in daily life this
state of inertia does not necessarily set in.
The present research showed that tight coupling is a very important
boundary condition for inaction inertia to occur. Of course, there may be
other boundary conditions influencing the inaction inertia effect. For
instance, for inaction inertia to occur there should be a significant
difference in attractiveness of the two action opportunities, which  is a
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crucial element which was included in almost all the demonstrations of
inaction inertia. Moreover, previous research has shown that inaction
inertia does not occur when the costs of continued inaction are too high,
for example because people need the opportunity to buy clothes for a
wedding that will take place in two days (Tykocinski & Pittman, 1998).
These findings can be interpreted as revealing other boundary conditions
for the occurrence of inaction inertia.
By focusing on decoupling a central but neglected element of the
inaction inertia phenomenon was investigated. With this approach new
insights were gathered that can be incorporated in the two main
explanations of inaction inertia to date.  One of these main explanations  is
the regret explanation; the other is the devaluation explanation. The
regret explanation posits that when making their current decision, people
may generate counterfactuals such as "if I had acted sooner my outcomes
would have been so much better". Staying inactive on the second
opportunity would be a means to avoid these thoughts (Tykocinski &
Pittman, 1998). The valuation explanation posits that the missed
opportunity  is used as an anchor against which the value of the current
opportunity is valuated (Arkes et al., 2002). Note that both explanations
presume that people couple their current decision to the missed
opportunity. As a consequence, one could argue that decoupling factors
like the ones currently revealed will reduce anticipated regret and
devaluation  of the current outcomes.
The main contribution of the present research  is the insight that
coupling of the missed and current opportunities  is a necessary condition
for inaction inertia to occur. Now that we know this, it is interesting to
look at previous inaction inertia literature to see whether earlier findings
may be explained in terms of the (de)coupling mechanism. Looking at
this literature with the current knowledge, other decoupling factors may
be  identified. For instance, the present Experiment 3.2 discussed
decoupling in terms of psychological distance. Apart from being close  or
distant to an event because more or less decisions were required to get
there, there are other ways in which two action opportunities may be
distant. An increase in temporal distance has been shown to decouple the
association between two events (Gourville & Soman, 1998) and it has
been shown to attenuate inaction inertia (Tykocinski & Pittman, 2001,
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Exp. 2; Zeelenberg et al., 2006, Exp. 2). Similar effects have been
obtained for spatial distance. Arkes et al. (2002) found that American
participants are influenced by missing a discount in their home town
(Athens, OH), but not by missing a discount in South East Asia. These
are two instances in which increased distance between the missed and the
current opportunity decreased the inaction inertia effect. With the present
findings  in mind we might also conclude that these effects of decreased
inaction inertia with increased temporal and spatial distance to the missed
opportunity are due to the decoupling effect of distance.
Another related decoupling factor might be the difference of source
offering the two opportunities. Previous results indicate that inaction
inertia decreases when the missed opportunity is offered by another
provider (Butler & Highhouse, 2000; Zeelenberg et al., 2006, Exp. 5).
Other factors might similarly influence inaction inertia such as difference
of brand, or color,  or size, or reason to purchase between the missed and
the current opportunity. These might also be factors that have a
decoupling effect by influencing distance and comparability between the
missed and current opportunity and that thus might attenuate the inaction
inertia effect.
Importantly, the implications of the present findings go beyond the
inaction inertia field and speak to many related phenomena. As argued
earlier,  most of our decisions  are  made in response to earlier outcomes or
decisions. Hence, the decoupling effects presented here can be expected
to generalize to related phenomena in which previous decisions influence
current decisions. Indeed, previous research has showed that the foot-in-
the-door effect can be decreased and even reversed when there is a larger
amount of time between the first and the second request and when the
second request is offered by another requester than the person making the
first request (Chartrand, Pinckert, & Burger, 1999). Again, these can be
viewed as factors that decrease the tight coupling between the first and
the second request and therefore decrease the foot-in-the-door effect.
Other decoupling factors may also decrease the foot-in-the-door effect,
for example, an ambiguous, or a less comparable first request may not
lead to an increased likelihood to act on the second request. The same
results may be expected for similar effects of sequential decision making,
such as the door-in-the-face technique (Cialdini et al., 1975) or the low-
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ball procedure (Cialdini, Caccioppo, Bassett, & Miller,  1978). Of course,
further research is needed to examine these expectations.
In conclusion, by using insights derived from the mental accounting
and transaction decoupling literature, the present research showed that
there are clear boundary conditions to the inaction inertia effect. Inaction
inertia does not entail that every time we miss out on a good deal we stay
inactive on subsequently offered deals and that we are not always
prisoners of our missed opportunities in the sense that we never let go of
them. In everyday terms, this means that we will not refrain from buying
underwear the rest of our lives when we miss  out on highly discounted
underwear. And that is a reassuring thought.
Chapter 4
Pfhop
DEALING WITH MISSED OPPORTUNITIES:
ACTION VS. STATE ORIENTATION MODERATES
INACTION INERTIA
People differ in how they cope with missed opportunities and bad
decisions. Some people dwell on missed opportunities, feel bad about
them for a long time and do not seem to be able to leave the past behind
them. Others get over those failures relatively quickly and focus on how
to improve the here and now instead. Extensive research has
demonstrated that these differences in coping reflect a fundamental
dimension in how people approach current challenging situations and
referred to it as state versus action orientation (see for a review, Kuhl &
Beckmann, 1994). The present research investigates how this orientation
influences an important behavioral consequence of missed opportunities
called inaction inertia (Tykocinski et al., 1995). Inaction inertia refers to
the effect that people, after missing out on an initial attractive
opportunity, are less likely to act on further opportunities despite their
objective attractiveness. Ifpeople differ in the way they cope with missed
opportunities, the influence of missed opportunities on current decisions
should differ accordingly. This chapter reports two experiments that
demonstrate a weaker inaction inertia effect for action-oriented people
than for state-oriented people.
Inaction inertia means that decisions to act on an attractive
opportunity in the present are negatively influenced by inactions from the
past. For example, although people may find the opportunity to book a
vacation on discount for $900 instead of $1000 very attractive, they will
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decline it when they missed an earlier opportunity to book it for $400.
Inaction inertia is demonstrated when likelihood to act on an attractive
current opportunity is lower when the difference in attractiveness
between the missed and the current opportunity is large than when it is
small. Thus, the more attractive the missed opportunity (initial inaction)
was, the lower the likelihood that people will act on an attractive action
opportunity now (inertia). This effect is very robust and has been found
for numerous different decisions, such as for buying shoes or beer,
joining fitness centers, booking vacations, investing in the stock market
and registering for college courses (Arkes et al., 2002; Butler &
Highhouse, 2000; Kumar, 2004; Sevdalis et al., 2006; Tykocinski et al.,
2004; Tykocinski & Pittman, 1998,2001; Tykocinski & Pittman, 2004;
Tykocinski et al., 1995; Van Putten et al., 2007; Zeelenberg et al., 2006;
Zeelenberg & Van Putten, 2005).
Because of its robustness, one might expect that whenever people
miss a more attractive opportunity to act, all else being equal, their
likelihood to act on a subsequent opportunity will inevitably decrease.
However, because some people seem to get over negative outcomes
quicker than others, an important determinant of the influence of missing
a more attractive opportunity on behavior might be the way people cope
with missing a more attractive opportunity. Action-oriented people
typically get over negative events quickly, and focus on taking action to
solve them, while state-oriented people find it typically difficult to
overcome a negative event, and keep ruminating about it and how it
affects their current state (see for overviews, Dieffendorff, Hall, Lord, &
Strean, 2000; Kuhl & Beckmann, 1994). The expectation is that,
compared to state-oriented people, action-oriented people are less
influenced by missing a more attractive opportunity when initiating
action on the current opportunity and they are less likely to show the
inaction inertia effect.
Note that the main characteristic that distinguishes action-oriented
people from state-oriented people is the ability to disengage from
unpleasant events. This does not mean that action-oriented people feel
less negatively about unpleasant events. Put differently, action and state-
oriented people will feel equally bad about missing an attractive
opportunity, but only state-oriented people willlet the previous
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opportunity influence current decisions. Missed opportunities may
influence current opportunities, because they are used as an anchor to
evaluate the current opportunity (Arkes et al., 2002; Zeelenberg et al.,
2006). As a result, people do not act on the current opportunity because it
is devaluated under the influence of the missed opportunity. Thus, action-
oriented people will probably show weaker inaction inertia effects than
state-oriented people. Not because action-oriented people experience less
regret after missing a more attractive prior opportunity, but because they
are able to overcome this negative experience when evaluating
subsequent events, and thus are less likely to devalue the current
opportunity.
This potential moderating effect of action orientation on inaction
inertia was investigated in two experiments. In Experiment 4.1 action
orientation was experimentally induced. In Experiment 4.2 chronic
individual differences in action orientation were assessed using Kuhl's
Action Control Scale (e.g., Kuhl & Beckmann, 1994). the main interest
in both experiments was how action versus state orientation would affect
the likelihood to act on the current opportunity (i.e., in the inaction inertia
effect). In addition to the effects on likelihood to act, Experiment 4.2
examined the process assumed to underlie the predictions more closely.
That is, experienced regret for the missed opportunity and valuation of
the subsequent opportunity were measured. This permitted the test
whether indeed state and action-oriented people are as likely to
experience regret over the missed opportunity, and whether the
differences in likelihood to act are indeed best explained by the
(de)valuation of the current opportunity.
EXPERIMENT 4.1
In this experiment participants were confronted with a standard inaction
inertia scenario, in which they were deciding about booking a trip to
Rome. They first read a part that they missed a very attractive
opportunity. Next, either an action-oriented or a state-oriented mindset
were experimentally induced. Because state orientation is typified by
rumination about and hanging onto past failures (Dieffendorff et al.,
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2000; Kuhl, 1981), participants in the state orientation conditions were
asked to describe their thoughts and feelings right after they find out
about missing an attractive opportunity. Since action orientation is
typified by a focus on the present state and focusing on getting over past
failures (Dieffendorff et al., 2000;  Kuhl, 1981), participants in the action
orientation conditions were asked to describe how they could improve
the situation. This induction of action and state orientation follows the
method of typical mindset priming (cf.Bargh & Chartrand, 2000) and
builds on two previous studies that induced an action or a state-oriented
mindset (Harmon-Jones & Harmon-Jones, 2002; Kuhl, 1981). Finally,
participants read that they could still book a less attractive trip to Rome,
and subsequently indicated their willingness to book this trip. the
hypothesis was that action-oriented people would be less prone to the
inaction inertia effect than state-oriented people.
Method
Participants and design
One hundred and forty-six students from Tilburg University completed
the questionnaire (71 males, 75 females, Aige = 20). They were randomly
assigned to one of the four conditions of a 2 (Difference  in
Attractiveness: Large vs. Small) x 2 (Action Orientation: Action vs.
State) between-participants design.
Procedure and measures
Participants were seated in separate cubicles in the laboratory and
received one of the scenarios of Zeelenberg et al. (2006). Participants
were randomly assigned to either the small or the large difference in
attractiveness condition. In the condition with a large [small] difference
in attractiveness scenario read as follows:
You adore Rome! Shortly you will have a whole week without
lectures and you would very much like to visit Rome. A friend
tells you that a local travel agency offers a completely organized
three-day trip to Rome. You can book the trip this week for €100
[€165] instead of the usual €199. This includes traveling with the
High Speed Train and two nights with breakfast at a four star hotel
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in the center of Rome.  He also tells you that you have to hurry
before it is too late and the trip is sold out. During the week after
you have spoken to your friend, you pass by the travel agency
several times and think about booking the trip. However, you do
not do so. When you finally want to book the trip it is sold out.
You are too late.
Next, participants in the state conditions were instructed to describe the
thoughts and feelings they would have in this situation. Participants in
the action conditions were instructed to describe what they could do to
improve this situation. After this, they turned the page and read the
following: "Now your friend calls you again and tells you that, although
you missed the previous opportunity, you can still book the trip this week
for €170." After reading the scenario, participants indicated the
likelihood that they would book the trip for €170 (0 - very unlikely, 10
very likely).
As a check of the experimental manipulation of action orientation
participants rated six  of the 12 items  of the Dutch translation of the
'Failure'-part of the Action Control Scale (ACS-90), a scale typically
used to measure participants' degree of action orientation. This scale
involves coping with the situations participants in inaction inertia studies
typically face: making a decision that is already initiated (people are on
their way to act on an attractive opportunity), which turns out less
fortunate than expected (on arrival, the opportunity turns out less
attractive than expected). This scale originally consists of 12 forced-
choice items. Each item describes a stressful situation and participants
indicate their preference for either an action or a state-oriented way of
coping with it. All items are listed in the Appendix. When this scale is
used to measure chronic action versus state orientation all items are used.
In this experiment on induced orientation, 6 items  of the scale were used
as a manipulation check. Pretesting showed that these were the items that
formed a reliable subscale (items 2,5,6,9,10, and 11, a = .63). State-
oriented answers were coded 0 and action-oriented answers were coded
1. All answers were summed to form an action orientation measure, with
higher scores indicating a higher degree of action orientation. The scores
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on the action orientation measure, which could range from 0 to 6, were
centered on the mean, such that people who were scored 0 on the action
orientation measure had a mean degree of action orientation. These
questions were introduced as questions about participants' personality,
because of the interest in who the participants were  and how they
normally act in certain situations. It was stressed that there were no right
or wrong answers, and that the best answer was the answer that appealed
to them the most.
Results and Discussion
Manipulation check
First, the effects on the action orientation manipulation check were
analyzed using a 2 x 2 ANOVA. The ANOVA revealed only a main
effect for action orientation, F (1, 142) = 8.51,p < .01,112 - .06.
Participants in the action conditions (M= 3.03, SD = 1.78) scored higher
on the action orientation scale than those  in the state conditions  (M =
2.21, SD =  1.54). This indicated that the manipulation of action vs. state
orientation was successful.
Likelihood to act
The results on the action likelihood measure are shown in Figure 4.1. A 2
x 2 ANOVA revealed a main effect of difference in attractiveness, F (1,
142) = 71.12,p < .001,42 = .33, and a significant interaction effect, F (1,
142) = 4.17, p <.05, 12 =.03. Simple Effect analyses revealed inaction
inertia for both action orientation conditions: people were more likely to
act when the difference between the missed and the current offer for a
trip to Rome was large than when this difference was small in the action,
F(1, 142) = 22.28, p < .001, 112 - .14, and in the state conditions, F (1,
142) = 50.65, p < .001, 112 - .26. Note, that as expected, the inaction
inertia effect is almost twice as strong in the state as compared to the
action conditions. Furthermore, likelihood to act in the large difference
conditions was significantly higher in the action condition than in the
state condition, F (1, 142) = 6.35, p < .02, 112 = .04. This difference was
not  significant in the small difference conditions, F (1,  142) = 0.11,  ns.,
112 = .00. Thus, action-oriented people were less influenced by the €100
missed offer in their decision to act on the €170 offer than state-oriented
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people. These results thus clearly support the reasoning that the more
people use an action-oriented way of coping with stressful situations, the
less they show inaction inertia.
EXPERIMENT 4.2
The results of Experiment 4.1 indicate that induced action orientation is
an important moderator of the inaction inertia effect. Experiment 4.2  was
conducted for two reasons. First, to validate the results of Experiment 4.1
with a measure of chronic differences in state versus action orientation.
For this purpose, chronic orientation of the participants was assessed a
week before running an experiment on the inaction inertia effect with the
same standard inaction inertia decision scenario as in Experiment 4.1.
The second contribution of Experiment 4.2 was that the process
underlying the differences in inaction inertia between action and state-
oriented people was investigated. Remember that the main characteristic
that distinguishes action-oriented people from state-oriented people is
their ability to  let go of unpleasant events when encountering new events.
It is not that action-oriented people will feel less bad about the unpleasant
event than state-oriented people, but rather their current and future
encounters will be influenced less by what happened in the past. In the
inaction inertia domain this would imply that action-oriented people may
be as likely to regret missing the prior opportunity as state-oriented
people. Action-oriented people may, however, be less prone to evaluate
the current opportunity in light of the prior missed opportunity than state-
oriented people.
The reasoning is thus, that action-oriented people do realize that they
missed a more attractive opportunity and therefore, depending on the
attractiveness of the missed opportunity, will feel the same degree of
regret as state-oriented people. However, it is expected that the influence
of the missed opportunity on the current decision to act will be  less
strong for action than for state-oriented people. Specifically, the
hypotheses are that (a) action orientation moderates the inaction inertia
effect, (b) that action orientation does not affect the regret felt over
missing out on the prior opportunity, and (c) that this moderating effect
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Figure 4.1. Mean Likelihood to Act (Standard Error in Bars) as a
Function  of Difference  in  Attractiveness  and  State versus  Action
Orientation in Experiment 4.1.
Il Large Difference in Attractiveness














of action versus state orientation on inaction inertia is mediated by the
differential valuation of the current opportunity.
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Method
One hundred and nineteen students (20 males, 99 females, M = 19age
years) at Tilburg University volunteered to participate in this study.
Participants arrived  in the laboratory and completed the 12 questions  of
the ACS-90 to measure their degree of action orientation. The items are
listed in the Appendix. State-oriented answers were coded 0 and action-
oriented answers were coded  1. All answers were summed to form an
action orientation measure, with higher scores indicating a higher degree
of action orientation (M= 5.74, SD = 2.80; a = .72). The scores on the
action orientation measure, which could range  from 0 to  12, were
centered on the mean, such that people who were scored 0 on the action
orientation measure had a mean degree of action orientation. Participants
returned to the laboratory a week later for the seemingly unrelated
inaction inertia study. They received the complete, uninterrupted scenario
of Experiment 4.1, which describes missing the more attractive discount
of either €100 (large difference)  or €165 (small difference). After reading
the scenario, participants indicated the likelihood that they would book
the trip for €170 (0 = very unlikely, 10 - very likely). Additionally, they
indicated experienced regret by asking how much they regretted missing
the more attractive opportunity (0 = not at all, 10 = veg much) and
valuation by asking them to indicate the amount in Euros they would be
willing to spend on the trip to Rome.
Results
Likelihood to act
The effects on likelihood to act of difference in attractiveness (contrast-
coded as -1 for small difference and 1 for large difference), the action
orientation score and their interaction were analyzed using a linear
regression analysis (see Table 4.1, first column). The results revealed a
significant interaction effect. The results of simple slope analyses (see
Fig. 4.2) showed that the relation between difference in attractiveness
and likelihood to act was significant when the score on the action
orientation measure was low (1 SD below the mean; B = -.34, p < .01).
Thus, state-oriented people showed a lower likelihood to act on the €170
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offer when the difference between this offer and the missed opportunity
was large than when this difference was small (indicating inaction
inertia). There was no effect of difference in attractiveness when the
score on the action orientation measure was high (1 SD above the mean;
B =.06, ns). These results thus support the hypothesis that action-oriented
people are less likely to show inaction inertia than state-oriented people.
Figure 4.2.. Likelihood to Act as a function of Difference in
Attractiveness for Participants with High vs. Low Scores on Action
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The results on the experienced regret measure were analyzed using a
linear regression analysis. The results revealed only a significant effect of
difference in attractiveness (B = .43, p < .001), showing that people feel
more regret when the difference in attractiveness is large than when the
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difference is small. The fact that the action/state orientation did not affect
experienced regret accords with the hypothesis that action and state-
oriented people are as likely to experience regret over missed
opportunities.
Valuation
The results on the valuation measures were analyzed using a linear
regression analysis (see Table 4.1, second column). The results revealed
a significant interaction effect. The results of simple slope analyses (see
Fig. 4.3) showed that the negative relation between difference in
attractiveness and likelihood to act was significant when the score on the
action orientation measure was low (1 SD below the mean; 0 = -.33, p =
.01). Thus, people with a state orientation were willing to pay less for the
current offer when the difference between this offer and the missed
opportunity was large than when this difference was small (indicating
inaction inertia). There was no such effect of difference in attractiveness
when the score on the action orientation measure was high (1 SD above
the mean; 4 = .19, ns). There was a slight trend towards a positive effect
of difference in attractiveness for action-oriented people, but this effect
did not reach significance. The results thus support the hypothesis that
action-oriented people are less likely to devaluate the current offer than
state-oriented people.
Mediated moderation
The theory was that the effect of action orientation on inaction inertia
was driven by the characteristic of action-oriented people to get over the
missed opportunity more quickly than state-oriented people. As a result,
valuation of the current opportunity would suffer less from the missed
opportunity for action than for state-oriented people, leading to a higher
likelihood to act on it. In other words, it was tested whether the
moderating effect of action orientation  on the relation between difference
in attractiveness and action likelihood was mediated by the difference in
valuation. The mediation analysis is displayed in Table 4.1. The data
show that valuation mediates the moderating effect of action orientation
on inaction inertia, because (a) the independent variable, in this case the
interaction between action orientation and difference in attractiveness,
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predicts the mediating variable, in this case valuation (see Table 4.1,
column 2); (b) the mediating variable predicts the dependent variable, in
this case likelihood to act; and (c) the effect of the independent variable
on the dependent variable is reduced when the mediator is entered into
the equation (see Table 4.1, column 1 vs. 3; Baron & Kenny, 1986). A
Sobel test (1982) confirmed that the interaction effect of difference in
attractiveness and action orientation on likelihood to act is significantly
mediated by valuation, z = 2.40, p < .05.
Figure 3.  Valuation  as  afunction  of Difference  in Attractiveness for
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Table 4.1 Mediation Analysis of Experiment 4.2
Likelihood Valuation Likelihood
to act to act
(with valuation)
Difference
in attractiveness (DA) -.14 -.07 -.12
Action orientation (AO) .16 .10 .13
DA xAO .20* .26**        .11
Valuation .35**
Note: standardized Beta coefficients are reported. *p< .05, ** p< .01
Discussion
These results clearly replicate the results of Experiment 4.1, and support
the  reasoning that the more people use an action-oriented way of coping
with stressful situations, the less they show inaction inertia. Moreover,
action and state-oriented people did not differ in the regret they
experienced over missing out on the prior opportunity. Both feel more
regret when they could have booked the trip for €100 than when they
could have booked the trip for €165. The data on valuation, including the
mediation analysis, suggest that the difference in the inaction inertia
effect between action and state-oriented people is best explained by the
degree to which they let the past opportunity influence their valuation of
the current opportunity. This difference in valuation caused the
differences in likelihood to book the trip, and thus in the inaction inertia
effect.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The goal of this chapter was to test the idea that the inaction inertia effect
is weaker for action-oriented people than for state-oriented people. The
idea was that action-oriented people get over missing a more attractive
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opportunity more easily than state-oriented people, because oftheir
typical style of coping with negative outcomes.  As a result, the
subsequent decision would be less influenced by missing the opportunity
for action-oriented people than for state-oriented people, resulting in less
devaluation  of the current opportunity and therefore a higher likelihood
to act on the current opportunity. Thus, it was predicted that the way of
dealing with missed opportunities determines their influence on the
decision to act on a subsequent opportunity. The results  of two
experiments clearly supported this prediction. Experiment 4.1 showed
that inducing an action orientation reduced the inaction inertia effect.
Experiment 4.2 replicated this result with an assessment of chronic action
versus state orientation and found that inaction inertia decreases when
people  use an action-oriented way of coping. Moreover, as predicted the
moderating effect of action orientation on inaction inertia is mediated by
the valuation of the current opportunity.
These results contribute significantly to the inaction inertia literature.
The present research shows that the difference in action versus state
orientation is an important determinant for the effect of missing a more
attractive opportunity on subsequent decisions. This thus shows that there
are individual differences in inaction inertia, but also, more importantly,
it provides insight into the explanation of inaction inertia. When people
are able to segregate the missed from the current opportunity they are
less likely to use the missed opportunity to devaluate the current
opportunity. This finding is related to earlier research showing attenuated
inaction inertia when the missed opportunity was perceived to be
segregated from the current opportunity, for example when the missed
opportunity was seen as less comparable than in the usual inaction inertia
studies (Van Putten et al., 2007). The current research contributes to this
finding by showing that personal differences in the capability to
segregate the opportunities have similar effects on inaction inertia, and
that the decreased devaluation  of the current opportunity  in this case
causes the inaction inertia effect to decrease.
An interesting additional result is that action versus state orientation
was successfully manipulated in Experiment 4.1. Usually, action and
state orientation are measured and the score is taken as an independent
variable (as in Experiment 4.2). This is interesting fur two reasons. First,
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this method of inducing action and state orientation could be used in
future research. Manipulation, instead of assignment to conditions based
on scores on a scale measuring action vs. state orientation, leads to more
efficient randomization of participants. Thus, confounding factors that
may influence the results can be more successfully minimized and causal
conclusions are more reliably drawn. Second, this might be helpful in
certain situations where action or state orientation impairs goal-
achievement, which, in an extreme example, is very relevant for people
suffering from clinical depression (see for an overview, Kuhl &
Beckmann, 1994).
On a more general note, this chapter shows that the way people cope
with negative prior outcomes has an important influence on subsequent
decisions relating to these outcomes. In this sense the difference in action
and state orientation might be helpful in understanding other phenomena
in decision making where past events interfere with current decisions.
For instance, once people invest time, money or effort into a course of
action, they are more likely to pursue that action than when no prior
investments were made (sunk cost effect; Arkes & Blumer, 1985). Based
on the current results one could expect that, since action-oriented people
get over past investments more easily than state-oriented people, they
therefore are less likely to show this sunk cost effect.  If so, this would
mean that people with an action orientation will be less influenced by
their earlier investment and hence are less likely to pursue an endeavor.
In other words, this leads to the provocative prediction that action-
oriented people will be more inactive than state-oriented people.
For now, we know that missing a more attractive opportunity does
not directly mean a subsequent opportunity will be declined as well.
People who are predisposed to get over it easily are lucky in this case,
because they will  be able to put the missed opportunity out of their minds
relatively easily. The ones among us who do not have such a strong
action orientation and who want to avoid inaction inertia effects can try
an autonomous mindset induction of thinking of ways to improve the
situation when they miss an attractive opportunity. This action-oriented
way of dealing with past inactions might decrease their likelihood of
inertia later on.
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Chapter 5
Why?
TURNING SWEET DEALS SOUR: INACTION
INERTIA AS A SOUR GRAPES PHENOMENON
Our days are filled with making decisions. Already in the morning we
have to decide to get up right away, or to snooze for five more minutes.
What to wear? What to drink with breakfast? When making all these
kinds of decisions, many options are deferred. For example, this morning
I did not wear a bear suit, I did not eat steak for breakfast, and I did not
choose tomato juice on the side. In this case the options were deferred,
because they are generally seen as silly choice options. However, many
options are deferred that could have been perfectly good choices. For
example, people choose not to go on vacation, or not to buy a product
although they intended to do so, because there is no clear reason for
preferring one option over the others, or because it is too difficult to
choose from the available options (Dhar, 1997; Iyengar & Lepper, 2000;
Schwartz, 2000; Shafir, Simonson, & Tversky, 1993). People also often
choose not to act when they are confronted with attractive action
opportunities, and hence they forego possibilities to be better off For
example, people sometimes turn down the opportunity to sign up for free
air miles when they can get 4,500 bonus miles for free (Tykocinski et al.,
1995). Why would such a sweet deal possibly be turned down?
Tykocinski et al. (1995) coined the term inaction inertia for this
surprising phenomenon. The idea is that sweet deals like this are turned
down, simply because even sweeter deals were previously missed. The
intriguing question concerning this phenomenon is, what causes the
inaction inertia effect? This chapter reports three studies that support a
new explanation of inaction inertia which holds that missing an initial
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attractive opportunity is frustrating and results in downgrading
subsequent opportunities that are still attractive, but less attractive than
the earlier one that was missed.
Inaction inertia is the phenomenon that "forgoing an attractive action
opportunity (initial inaction) decreases the likelihood that subsequent
action will be taken in the same domain" (Tykocinski & Pittman, 1998,
p. 607). For example, people are likely to buy a ski pass that is on sale for
$90 instead of $100, but the likelihood to buy the same pass decreases
substantially when earlier on they missed the opportunity to buy the ski
pass for $40 (Tykocinski et al., 1995). The larger this difference in
attractiveness between the initial and the current opportunity, the stronger
the inaction inertia effect.
When there is a clear difference in attractiveness between the missed
and current opportunity, the current opportunity is experienced as a loss,
and it does not matter if one could have prevented missing the initial
opportunity or not (Tykocinski et al., 1995, Exp. 4-6; Zeelenberg et al.,
2006, Exp. 1). It is clearly frustrating, being confronted with an
opportunity that compares badly with the recently missed opportunity,
even though it may still be an objectively good opportunity. What can
people do to cope with such frustration? Elster (1983) borrowed La
Fontaine's famous fable about the fox and the grapes to explain how
constraints such as unavailability may shape our preferences. In this fable
a fox is trying to pick appetitive grapes. But, no matter how hard he tries
and how high he jumps, he cannot reach them. Finally, the fox walks
away, shrugging, saying to himsel f that it were sour grapes anyway.
Thus, the fox is constrained by his inability to pick the grapes and
changes his preference  for the grapes by convincing himself that they
were sour anyway. By making the grapes less appetitive, not being able
to eat them does not hurt that much.
Zeelenberg et al. (2006, p. 103), suggested that a similar mechanism
could be at work in inaction inertia. They argued that "decision makers
may comfort themselves with the idea that the missed opportunity (and
therefore the current opportunity,  i f it resembles the missed opportunity)
was not that great after all". To cope with the bitter feeling of missing a
better deal, people might turn the deal sour by devaluating or trivializing
it, thereby making it less interesting to them. Previous research has
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provided some preliminary findings that accord with this view. Arkes,
Kung and Hutzel (2002) showed that people value the offer less when the
difference between the missed and the current opportunity is large than
when it is small. When a $40 offer on a normally $100 ski pass is missed
people think the ski pass is worth only $84.05, whereas if a $80 offer was
missed people think it is worth $96.97. Thus, the value placed on the
opportunity is indeed lower, the more attractive the missed opportunity
was. The theory proposed here is that this devaluation is a way to
comfort oneself of the bitter feeling of missing a better deal. This so
called "sour grapes" explanation shares important aspects with
retroactive pessimism, which shows that people alter their perception of
the probability of reaching an alternative, more positive outcome,  to
reduce their disappointment with the actual outcome (Tykocinski, 2001;
Tykocinski, Pick, & Kedmi, 2002; Tykocinski & Steinberg, 2005). For
example, after Barak won the 1999 Israeli elections, citizens who voted
for Netanyahu were less satisfied with the outcome  of the elections.
However, the Netanyahu voters reported a higher likelihood that Barak
would win after the elections than before (Tykocinski, 2001). Thus, there
are two ways to reduce negative affect when people cannot get what they
want.  One  is to lower the value, or importance  of the outcome  (sour
grapes), the other is to lower the probability that the outcome could have
been obtained (retroactive pessimism).
The sour grapes explanation shares important aspects with alternative
explanations of inaction inertia, but, we argue, it goes beyond these other
explanations in the sense that it makes unique predictions and is more
parsimonious. One important other explanation, in terms of devaluation
(Arkes et al., 2002), as illustrated above, concerns the worth of the
opportunity. According to the devaluation explanation, the missed
opportunity  is used as an anchor to estimate the worth of the option under
consideration. People are less likely to act on the current opportunity,
because they do not believe it is worth the money. Thus, the basis of sour
grapes and devaluation is the same, such that both see inaction inertia as
an effect stemming from downgrading the current opportunity. However,
the dissimilarities with the sour grapes explanation are that (a) the sour
grapes explanation considers trivialization next to devaluation as a way
to comfort oneself; and that (b) according to the devaluation explanation
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this downgrading is not necessarily a way of coping with negative affect.
Therefore, devaluation was not explicitly related to negative affect. The
devaluation explanation as such cannot explain findings that show the
importance of negative affect  in the inaction inertia effect. For example,
inaction inertia decreases when people expect continued confrontation
with the more attractive, but unavailable opportunity. Also, it decreases
under the effect of time pressure, when the option under consideration is
required within two days (Tykocinski & Pittman, 1998). It is difficult to
explain these findings by a mere devaluation in price. Confrontation
should leave the inaction inertia effect unchanged, or should strengthen it
because  of the continued reminder of the more attractive anchor.
Likewise, the fact that the option is needed should have nothing to do
with the influence of an anchor. Thus, although devaluation can explain,
and clearly seems to play an important role in the inaction inertia effect,
this explanation as such cannot account for these moderating effects.
In the sour grapes explanation, the downgrading of the current
opportunity also plays a central role. However, this explanation also
gives a reason why devaluation occurs. It stems from the urge to reduce
the frustrating bitterness of the difference in attractiveness with the
missed opportunity. Hence, it can account for the findings concerning the
importance of negative affect,  such as caused by continued confrontation
with the unavailable opportunity. Because one is then constantly
reminded of the difference of attractiveness with the initial opportunity,
souring the opportunity is ineffective in reducing the bitterness caused by
it. The same holds for time pressure. Typically, people downgrade the
importance or attractiveness of the option. Realizing that the clothes  are
necessary will make it harder to downgrade the clothes by making them
less interesting. Hence, downgrading is no longer a means to undo the
negative feelings and the current opportunity stays attractive.
Another explanation of inaction inertia is in terms of decision regret.
This explanation shares with the sour grapes explanation that it revolves
around reducing or regulating the experience of negative affect. The
explanation of inaction inertia in terms of regret defines inaction inertia
as a way to reduce regret for missing the more attractive opportunity.
There are two regret explanations. The first regret explanation is that
people stay inactive on the current opportunity to escape the regret they
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feel for missing the first opportunity (Arkes et al., 2002). Thus, the regret
people feel prevents them from acting on the current opportunity. The
second is that people stay inactive to avoid feeling regret (Tykocinski &
Pittman, 1998,2001). Instead of experienced regret withholding them to
take action, this theory says that people anticipate that they will feel
regret i f they would take the current opportunity, because they will  be
reminded of the missed opportunity. To avoid this anticipated regret,  they
do not act on the current opportunity. Both theories thus revolve around
reducing regret caused by the missed opportunity, but one says it causes
inaction by its immobilizing effect after missing it, and the other says it
causes inaction because the current opportunity will constantly remind
one the regret.
Although initial results were consistent with this explanation, more
recent studies documented cases in which regret could not account for the
inaction inertia effect (Zeelenberg et al., 2006). Thinking about the
current decision, for example, decreased the inaction inertia effect, but
also increased the regret people felt over missing the initial opportunity.
Moreover, responsibility for missing the initial opportunity had no effect
on inaction inertia, but at the same time increased regret. Importantly,
according to the sour grapes explanation not regret is regulated, but a
more general frustrating bitterness that is not necessarily related to how
or why the negative outcome materialized. In other words, this negative
affect can occur without feelings of responsibility. Regret, by contrast, is
clearly linked to bad outcomes due to one's own mistakes or bad choices
(Zeelenberg, Van Dijk, & Manstead, 1998). Therefore, the sour grapes
explanation, unlike the regret explanation, can account for the important
finding that responsibility has no effect on inaction inertia. Finally, it is
difficult to use the regret explanation to account for the devaluation
effects. According to the avoidance of regret explanation, the regret  for
missing the initial opportunity is so painful that people avoid the current
opportunity to put an end to it. This indicates that the current opportunity
is highly valuated by people, because it can trigger this painful
experience again. Note that this is the opposite prediction of what
devaluation measures showed, namely that the current opportunity is
seen as less valuable the larger the difference in attractiveness with the
missed opportunity.
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Sour grapes might thus be a good explanation for the inaction inertia
effect. At least post hoc, it can account for findings that cannot be
explained in terms of regret or simple devaluation. Therefore the present
research aims to put this explanation to the test and investigate how
inaction inertia is the result of self-regulatory processes. Three
experiments were conducted in which factors were manipulated that
would either stimulate the sour grapes mechanism or prevent it from
being useful.
The sour grapes explanation holds that to undo the bitter feeling
associated with missing the more attractive opportunity, people adapt
their preferences by downgrading the current opportunity. As a result,
people see the current opportunity as unimportant and therefore do not
act on it. Two predictions follow from this: (1) when there is frustration
about the difference in attractiveness of the current opportunity with the
missed opportunity, but downgrading is no longer a means to undo it,
inaction inertia will decrease, (2) when frustration about the difference in
attractiveness is low, there is no need to downgrade the opportunity and
inaction inertia will not occur.
Experiments 5.1  and 5.2 tested Prediction 1, Experiment 5.3 tested
Prediction 2. In all experiments likelihood to act on the current
opportunity was assessed (the crucial dependent variable in inaction
inertia studies). Frustration was measured to grasp the annoying feeling
elicited by the difference in attractiveness between the missed and the
current opportunity. Just like regret, frustration stems from a discrepancy
between a wanted and a real outcome, but unlike regret, frustration does
not necessarily stem from feeling responsible for this discrepancy
(Roseman, Wiest, & Swartz, 1994). Therefore, next to likelihood to act,
regret and frustration were measured in Experiment 5.1. In Experiment
5.2 and 5.3 the importance of the opportunity to measure the degree of
downgrading was additionally asked.
EXPERIMENT  5.1
Experiment 5.1 was designed to test the first prediction, that inaction
inertia decreases when downgrading the opportunity becomes more
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difficult. The reasoning behind this experiment is that when people are
confronted with the current opportunity, the frustration stemming from
the difference in attractiveness with the missed opportunity leads them to
downgrade it, turn it sour. However, when people have thought about the
positive aspects  of the opportunity before, downgrading  is more difficult
to do, since it would be inconsistent with their earlier thoughts, and
inaction inertia should be weakened.
Participants received a typical inaction inertia decision scenario in
which an opportunity to book a vacation was offered after a more
attractive opportunity to book a vacation was missed with either a large
or a small difference in attractiveness. One group participants (control
condition) only read the scenario. The participants in the other two
experimental conditions were asked to generate either negative aspects,
or positive aspects of the more attractive missed opportunity. Since the
expectation is that participants spontaneously engage in downgrading
when confronted with a missed opportunity, generating negative aspects
should produce similar effects as in the control condition. On the other
hand, generating positive aspects should weaken inaction inertia relative
to the control group, because  it goes against the operation  of the  sour
grapes mechanism and makes it harder to downgrade the attractive
opportunity. Thus, the counterintuitive prediction is that letting the
participants think about the positive aspects decreases inaction inertia.
Method
Participants  and design
One hundred eighty-six students from Tilburg University completed the
questionnaire (108 males, 76 females, 2 failed to indicate gender, Mage -
21).  They were randomly assigned to one of the six conditions of a 2
(Difference in Attractiveness: Large vs. Small) x 3 (Generated Aspects:
Control vs. Positive vs. Negative) between-participants design.
Procedure and measures
Participants were approached at several places at the university campus.
They were randomly assigned to either the small or the large difference
in attractiveness condition. The scenario was closely modeled after the
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Zeelenberg et al. scenario (2006, p. 94) Experiment 3. The scenario in the
large [small] difference condition read as follows (translated form the
original Dutch):
You adore Rome! Shortly you will have a whole week
without lectures and you would very much like to visit
Rome. A friend tells you that a local travel agency
offers a completely organized three-day trip to Rome.
You can book the trip this week for €100 [€165] instead
of the usual €199. This includes traveling with the High
Speed Train and two nights with breakfast at a four star
hotel in the center of Rome. The friend also tells you
that you have to hurry before it is too late and the trip is
sold out. Although you intended to go there, you didn't
get to the travel agency in tiine. the trip it is sold out.
You are too late.
After reading this scenario the participants in the positive aspects
condition read the following question: "After missing this trip to Rome
you consider how pleasant it would be to  go to Rome  in the middle of the
summer. Name two aspects that are attractive to such a trip". The
participants in the negative aspects condition were told that they realized,
after missing the trip, that going to  Rome  in the middle  of the summer
actually was quite unpleasant. They were asked to name two negative
aspects of such a trip. The participants in the no aspects condition were
not asked to do anything after reading the scenario. Then, they indicated
their feelings of frustration and regret after missing the attractive
opportunity (0 = not at all, 10 = very much).
Next, they all read: "Your friend calls you again and tells
you that, although you missed the previous opportunity, you
can still book the trip this week for €170." Participants
indicated the likelihood to act on this opportunity (0 = veg
unlikely, 10 - very likely).
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Results
The results on the dependent measures are shown in Table 5.1, and all
were analyzed using 2 x 3 ANOVA's.
Table 5.1. Ratings  on  the  Dependent  variables  as  a  Function  of Large  vs.




Dependent variables: M SD M SD M  SD
Likelihood to Act
Small difference 8.50 (1.50) 7.60 (1.75) 7.84 (1.55)
Large difference 5.52 (2.29) 6.52 (1.65) 5.63 (2.21)
Frustration
Small difference 2.91 (2.21) 5.83 (2.65) 4.94 (2.08)
Large difference 5.87 (2.66) 6.77 (1.96) 6.53 (2.36)
Regret
Small difference 2.88 (1.96) 5.17 (2.56) 5.44 (2.31)
Large difference 6.13 (1.95) 6.65 (1.96) 6.83 (2.34)
Note. Ratings were made on a 11-point scales, with endpoints labeled not likely (0) and
veg likely (10), not at aH (0) and very much (10)
Likelihood to act
The results revealed a significant main effect of difference  in
attractiveness, F (1,180) = 59.67, p < .001,112 - .25, and a significant
interaction effect, F (2,180) = 4.14, p < .05, 112 = .04. Simple Effect
analyses revealed inaction inertia in all conditions, but the effect was
considerably smaller in the positive aspects condition, F (1,180) = 5.25,
p < .05, r12 = .03, than in the negative aspects, F (1,180) = 22.18, p <
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.001, 112 - .11, and the control condition, F (1,180) = 41.11,p<.001,112
=.19. Thus, inaction inertia effect is weaker when the use of the sour
grapes mechanism is interfered by generating positive aspects about the
opportunity than when it is encouraged by generating negative aspects, or
when the use of sour grapes is not influenced.
Frustration
The results revealed a significant main effect of difference  in
attractiveness, F (1,180) = 28.79, p < .001, 112 = .14, a significant main
effect of generated aspects, F(2, 180) = 11.09, p < .001, 712 -.11, and a
significant interaction effect, F (2,180) = 3.06, p = .05, 112 - .03. Simple
Effect analyses revealed an effect of difference in attractiveness in the
control condition, F (1, 180) = 25.50, p < .001,112 - .12, and in the
negative aspects condition, F (1,180) = 7.26, p < .01, 42 = .04. No
significant effect was observed in the positive aspects condition, F (1,
180) = 2.49, ns. Naming positive aspects thus reduced the effect of the
attractiveness  of the missed opportunity on frustration,  such that people
were all more frustrated than in the control, or in the negative aspects
conditions.
Regret
The results revealed a significant main effect of difference in
attractiveness, F (1,180) = 40.22, p < .001,112 - .18, a significant main
effect of generated aspects, F(2,180) = 10.22, p <.001,112 -.10, and a
significant interaction effect, F (2,180) = 3.60,p < .05,112 = .04. Simple
Effect analyses revealed a stronger effect of difference in attractiveness
in the control condition, F (1,180) = 34.86, p < .001,  12 = .16, than in the
negative aspects condition, F(1, 180) = 6.31,p = .01, 112 = .03, and the
positive aspects condition, F (1,180) = 6.79, p = .01,  12 - .04. Regret
thus differed between the conditions, because the effect of difference in
attractiveness was stronger in the control condition than in the conditions
where either positive or negative aspects.
Turning sweet deals sour    19
Discussion
The results show that inaction inertia decreases when participants think
about the positive aspects of the initial opportunity. Highlighting the
attractiveness  of the initial opportunity thus decreased inaction inertia.
This is in line with the sour grapes mechanism, which predicts that when
downgrading the considered opportunity is discouraged by thinking of
positive aspects instead, inaction inertia is decreased. Moreover,
frustration was high irrespective ofdifference in attractiveness between
the current and the initial opportunity when participants generated
positive aspects. Thus, the typical inaction inertia condition mostly
resembled the condition in which the sour grapes mechanism is
encouraged. This supports the idea that the sour grapes mechanism plays
a role in the causation of the inaction inertia effect. The regret ratings
shows that regret followed a different pattern than frustration or action
likelihood. Interestingly, regret increased in both conditions where
participants thought about aspects of the considered opportunity (cf.,
Zeelenberg et al., 2006), but frustration and likelihood to act were
determined by the contents of their thoughts.  All  in all, these results  are
in  favor of an explanation of inaction inertia by the sour grapes
mechanism.
EXPERIMENT  5.2
Experiment 5.1 showed that inaction inertia decreases when people look
at a typical inaction inertia situation in a way that counteracts the sour
grapes mechanism. This first experiment therefore supported the sour
grapes explanation of inaction inertia.  To test this explanation further
Experiment 5.2 was conducted. The sour grapes mechanism predicts that
people downgrade the opportunity to reduce the frustration elicited by the
more attractive missed opportunity. From this prediction follows the
hypothesis that when there is information available that impairs
downgrading the opportunity under consideration, the option should stay
interesting and inaction inertia will decrease. Because downgrading is
impaired, frustration  will  stay high.  The use of the sour grapes
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mechanism was discouraged by emphasizing the attractiveness of the
option under consideration.  I f the prediction following from the sour
grapes mechanism holds, this induction should decrease the inaction
inertia effect. To measure the sour grapes process of downgrading the
current opportunity participants were asked to rate how important the
opportunity was to them.
Method
Participants and design
One hundred and sixty students from Tilburg University and Erasmus
University completed the questionnaire (76 males, 82 females, 2 failed to
indicate their gender, Mage = 22). They were randomly assigned to one of
the four conditions of a 2 (Difference in Attractiveness: Large vs. Small)
x 2 (Emphasis: No vs. Yes) between-participants design.
Procedure and measures
Participants were approached at several places at the university campus.
Participants were randomly assigned to either the small or the large
difference in attractiveness condition. The scenario was closely modeled
after the Van Putten et al. coffee machine scenario (2007, Experiment 2).
The scenario in the large [small] difference/ no emphasis condition read
as follows (translated form the original Dutch):
You consider buying a new coffee machine. On the university
campus this week you overheard a conversation, in which
somebody told he had bought the same coffee machine you would
like with a 50% [20%] discount and that this discount lasts until
next week. Although you intended to go there, you didn't get to
the store in time and the discount expired. A few days later you
walk  by the store  and   see  the same coffee machine  with  a   10%
discount.
The  emphasis  of the attractiveness was induced by adding a conversation
with a friend after missing the initial opportunity:
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When you tell a friend that you missed the opportunity to buy a
coffee machine with a discount, he tells you that the coffee
machine would have been a great purchase. With that particular
coffee machine you can rapidly make very tasty coffee.
Next, all participants indicated the likelihood of buying the coffee
machine with  10% discount (0 = very unlikely, 10 - very  likely), the
importance of buying the coffee machine, the frustration and regret of
missing the coffee machine with a 50% discount(0 = not at all, 10 = very
much).
Results
The results on the dependent measures are shown in Table 5.2, and all are
analyzed using 2 x 2 ANOVA's.
Likelihood to act
The results revealed a significant main effect of difference in
attractiveness, F (1,156) = 10.82, p < .001,112 = .07, a significant main
effect of emphasis, F (1,156) = 21.20,p < .001, r12 - .12 and a significant
interaction effect, F(1,156) = 4.71, p < .05, 42 - .03. Simple Effect
analyses revealed inaction inertia only in the no emphasis conditions, F
(1,156) = 14.90, p < .001, 112 = .09, not in the emphasis conditions, F (1,
156) = 0.63, ns. Thus, when the attractiveness ofthe coffee machine was
emphasized, people were  less  influenced by the attractiveness of the
missed opportunity and were therefore more likely to take the
opportunity to buy the coffee machine with 10% discount than when the
attractiveness of the coffee machine  was not emphasized.
Importance
The results revealed a significant main effect of difference  in
attractiveness, F (1,156) =  11.98, p = .001, 42 = .03, a significant main
effect of emphasis, F (1,156) = 4.82, p < .05,112 = .07 and a significant
interaction effect, F (1,156)-4.19, p<.05,112=.03. Simple Effect
analyses revealed only an effect of difference in attractiveness in the no
emphasis conditions, F (1,156) = 9.00, p < .01, 112 = .06, not in the
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emphasis conditions, F (1,156) = 0.01, ns. Thus, people trivialized the
opportunity to buy the coffee machine the more attractive the missed
opportunity was, but only in the control conditions, not when the
attractiveness  of the missed opportunity was emphasized.
Table 5.2. Ratings on the Dependent variables as a Function of
Difference in Attractiveness and Emphasis in Experiment 5.2
Emphasis
No Yes
Dependent variables: M SD M   SD
Likelihood to Act
Small difference 6.50 (2.43) 6.43 (2.14)
Large difference 4.43 (2.93) 7.00 (2.01)
Importance
Small difference 4.30 (2.08) 4.78 (2.24)
Large difference 2.88 (2.05) 4.73 (2.12)
Frustration
Small difference 5.10 (2.08) 6.43 (2.19)
Large difference 6.68 (2.67) 7.13 (2.48)
Regret
Small difference 5.05 (2.47) 5.95 (2.41)
Large difference 6.78 (2.56) 6.90 (2.65)
Note. Ratings were made on 11-point scales, with endpoints labeled not likely (0) and
very likely ( 10), and not at all (0) and verv much ( 10)
Frustration
The results revealed a significant main effect of difference in
attractiveness, F (1,156) - 8.23, p < .01,112 = .05, and a significant main
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effect of emphasis, F (1, 156) = 5.01, p < .05,112 = .03. The interaction
effect was not significant. However, simple effect analyses revealed that
frustration was higher in the large difference condition than in the small
difference condition, but only in the no emphasis conditions, F (1,156) =
7.89, p < .01,112 = .05, not in the emphasis conditions, F (1,156) = 1.56,
ns. Thus, people were more frustrated the more attractive the missed
opportunity was, but this effect of difference in attractiveness was not
significant when the attractiveness  of the missed opportunity was
emphasized.
Regret
The results only revealed a significant main effect of difference  in
attractiveness, F (1,156) =  11.25, p - .001,42 = .07. People felt more
regret when they missed the opportunity to buy the coffee machine with a
50% discount than when the missed the 20% discount. The other effects
were not significant.
Mediated moderation
The theory was that the effect of emphasis on inaction inertia was driven
by the lower ability to downgrade the option under consideration in the
emphasis condition compared to the no emphasis condition. As a result,
the rated importance of the current opportunity would suffer less  from the
missed opportunity when the attractiveness was emphasized than in the
no emphasis condition, leading to a higher likelihood to act on it. In other
words,  it was tested whether the moderating effect of emphasis on the
relation between difference in attractiveness and action likelihood was
mediated by the difference in importance. The mediation analysis is
displayed in Table 5.3. The data show that importance mediates the
moderating effect of emphasis on inaction inertia, because (a) the
independent variable, in this case the interaction between emphasis and
difference in attractiveness, predicted the mediating variable, in this case
importance (see Table 5.3, column 2); (b) the mediating variable
predicted the dependent variable, in this case likelihood to act; and (c) the
effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable was reduced
when the mediator was entered into the equation (see Table 5.3, column
1 vs. 3; Baron & Kenny, 1986). A Sobel test (1982) confirmed that the
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interaction effect of difference in attractiveness and emphasis  on
likelihood to act is significantly mediated by importance, z = 1.95, p =
.05.
Table 5.3. Mediation Analysis of Experiment 5.2
Likelihood Importance Likelihood
to act to act
(with Importance)
Difference
in attractiveness (DA) -.39** -.32** -.28**
Emphasis (E) .18                 .11                   .14
DA XE .27* .27* .18
Importance .35**
Note: standardized Beta coefficients are reported. *p< .05, ** p< .01
Discussion
The results of Experiment 5.2 extended the findings of Experiment 5.1  in
three important ways. First, they again support the idea that sour grapes
is a causal mechanism in the inaction inertia effect. By emphasizing the
attractiveness of the option under consideration,  it is  more di fficult to
downgrade it and inaction inertia disappears. Second, the measurement of
importance show that the opportunity is downgraded more, the larger the
difference in attractiveness in the typical inaction inertia situation, but not
when the attractiveness  of the opportunity is emphasized.  Thus,  in  the
typical inaction inertia situation people think the opportunity is less
important when they missed a more attractive opportunity. They do not
act on the current opportunity, because they are less interested in it. This
again leads to the striking finding that enhancing the attractiveness of the
missed opportunity decreases the inaction inertia effect. This makes
sense, however, from a sour grapes perspective, because downgrading
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under these circumstances is made less plausible. Third, the results again
support that the manipulations of the sour grapes mechanism affect
frustration differently than regret. In fact in this experiment frustration
was higher when the difference in attractiveness between the missed and
the current opportunity was large than when it was small, but only in the
control condition. Regret, on the other hand, was also influenced by
difference in attractiveness  when the attractiveness  of the opportunity
was emphasized. Experiment 5.2 thus provides strong evidence in favor
of the sour grapes explanation of inaction inertia.
EXPERIMENT 5.3
The first two experiments show that manipulations that discourage
(naming positive aspects of the missed opportunity in Exp.  1,
emphasizing the attractiveness  of the missed opportunity in  Exp.  2) the
use of the sour grapes mechanism decrease inaction inertia.  In both
experiments downgrading had become more difficult when the sour
grapes mechanism was more difficult to use, resulting in higher
frustration than in the typical inaction inertia condition. These results
supported the first prediction: when there is frustration about the
difference in attractiveness of the current opportunity with the missed
opportunity, but downgrading is no longer a means to undo it, inaction
inertia will decrease. In Experiment 5.3 the second prediction was tested:
when frustration about the difference in attractiveness is low, there is no
need to downgrade the opportunity and inaction inertia will not occur.
Note that the sour grapes explanation predicts that inaction inertia is
caused by the downgrading of the opportunity to reduce the frustration  of
missing the initial opportunity. Frustration is thus important, because it
triggers this process of downgrading, but it is not the crucial motivation
for action.
Experiment 5.3 was designed to further test the sour grapes
explanation. Participants received a typical inaction inertia situation,
where they are deciding to act on an opportunity to take an internship in
the U.S, but missed a more attractive opportunity for an internship
before.  In  one hal f of the conditions the difference in attractiveness with
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the current internship is small, in the other hal f it is large. All participants
were then again divided in two groups. One group only learned about the
missed and the current opportunity, the other group learned that the a
priori chance of missing the initial opportunity was 90%. The first
hypothesis  was that this high expectation of missing the more attractive
opportunity would decrease the frustration over missing it. The second
hypothesis was that this increased expectation of missing the more
attractive internship would render the use of the sour grapes mechanism
unnecessary, because there is no frustration to reduce, and thus that there
would be less downgrading. Because of the decreased downgrading there
would be a higher likelihood to act on the current offer of an internship.
Method
Participants and design
One hundred and forty-three students from Tilburg University and The
Hague University completed the questionnaire (60 males, 79 females, 4
failed to indicate their gender, Mage = 22). They were randomly assigned
to one of the four conditions of a 2 (Difference in Attractiveness: Large
vs.  Small)  x 2 (Chance of missing: Control vs. 90%) between-
participants design.
Procedure and measures
Participants were approached at several places at the university campus.
Participants were randomly assigned to either the small or the large
difference in attractiveness condition. In the condition with a large
[small] difference in attractiveness scenario read as follows:
In the final year of your study it is possible to be trained on the
job.  You  like the idea of gathering practical knowledge and at the
same time going to a foreign country. At the beginning of the
year you considered the list of foreign student internship
programs and one particular internship attracted your attention. It
is an internship within a large and impressive company with a
good reputation [It is an internship within a medium sized
company, which has an acceptable and even somewhat above
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average reputation]. Furthermore, this student internship  is  in  the
United States, a country where you always wanted to go. You
decide to apply for this internship. A week after the application
you are called with the message that you are not hired for the
student internship, another applicant was more suitable for
thejob. They offer you another student internship within a small
and non-familiar company in the United States.
In the 90% chance of missing condition, the probability of missing the
initial opportunity was manipulated by adding the following sentence
after "You decide to apply for this internship":
In the first meeting you hear that the probability that you can join
the program is not that high. With your CV and grades the chance
that you will be rejected is 90%.
Next, all participants indicated the likelihood ofjoining the current
internship (0 = very unlikely, 10 = very likely), the importance ofjoining
the internship, the frustration and regret of missing the first internship (0
= not at all, 10 - very much).
Results
The results on the dependent measures are shown in Table  5.4,  and  are all
analyzed using 2 x 2 ANOVA's.
Likelihood to act
The results revealed a marginally significant main effect of difference in
attractiveness, F (1,139) = 3.37,p = .07, 112 = .02, a significant main
effect of chance of missing, F (1,139) = 4.68, p <.05, 92 -.03  and a
significant interaction effect, F (1,139) - 3.86,p - .05,  12 - .02. Simple
Effect analyses revealed inaction inertia only in the control condition, F
(1,139) = 7.06, p < .01, 92 = .05, not in the 90% chance of missing
conditions, F (1,139) - 0.01, ns. Thus, when the chance of missing the
initial opportunity for an internship was 90% people were more likely to
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Table 5.4. Ratings on the Dependent variables as a Function of
Difference in Attractiveness and Chance in Experiment 5.3
90% chance of missing
No Yes
Dependent variables: M SD M    SD
Likelihood to Act
Small difference 6.24 (2.19) 6.31 (1.84)
Large difference 4.89 (2.36) 6.35 (2.05)
Importance
Small difference 5.94 (1.94) 5.56 (2.04)
Large difference 4.94 (2.34) 5.95 (1.97)
Frustration
Small difference 7.26 (1.95) 5.58 (2.61)
Large difference 6.08 (2.13) 6.14 (2.14)
Regret
Small difference 6.29 (2.83) 6.44 (1.86)
Large difference 5.94 (2.19) 5.94 (2.04)
Note. Ratings were made on  11-point scales, with endpoints labeled not likely (0) and
very likely (10), and not at all (0) and very much (10)
take the opportunity to go on internship with the less attractive company,
than when no chances ofrejection were mentioned.
Importance
The results revealed a significant interaction effect, F (1,139) = 4.02, p <
·05, T12 = .03. Simple Effect analyses revealed that obtaining the current
internship was more important when the difference in attractiveness was
small than when it was large only in the control conditions, F (1,139) =
4.10, p < .05, 112 = .03, not in the 90% chance of missing conditions, F (1,
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139) = 0.64, ns. Thus, people trivialized the current opportunity in the
control conditions, not when the chance of missing the initial internship
was 90%.
Frustration
The results revealed a significant main effect of chance of missing, F (1,
139) = 4.80, p < .05,112 - .03, and a significant interaction effect, F(1,
139) = 5.43, p < .05, 112 - .04. Simple Effect analyses revealed a
difference in frustration only in the control conditions, F (1,139) = 4.96,
P < ·05, 112 - .03, not in the 90% chance of missing conditions, F (1,139)
= 1.13, ns. Thus, people felt more frustrated the more attractive the
missed internship was,  but only when no chances of missing were
mentioned. When there was a 90% chance of missing the initial
internship, frustration did not depend on difference in attractiveness
Regret
The results revealed no effect of difference in attractiveness or chance on
the regret ratings.
Mediated moderation
The theory was that the effect of the chance of missing the initial
opportunity on inaction inertia was driven by the lower necessity to
downgrade the option under consideration  in the 90% chance of missing
condition compared to the control condition. As a result, the rated
importance of the current opportunity was expected to suffer less from
the missed opportunity when the chance of missing the more attractive
internship was 90% than in the control condition, leading to a higher
likelihood to act. The mediation analysis testing these predictions is
displayed in Table 5.5. The data show that importance mediates the
moderating effect of chance on inaction inertia, because (a) the
independent variable, in this case the interaction between chance and
difference in attractiveness, predicted the mediating variable, in this case
importance (see Table 5.5, column 2); (b) the mediating variable
predicted the dependent variable, in this case likelihood to act; and (c) the
effect of the independent variable  on the dependent variable was reduced
when the mediator was entered into the equation
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Table 5.5.  Mediation  Analysis  of Experiment  5.3
Likelihood Importance Likelihood
to act to act
(with Importance)
Difference
in attractiveness (DA) -.31** -.24* -.13*
90% chance
of missing (C) .02 -.10 .10
DA xC .28* .29* .07
Importance .66**
Note:  standardized Beta coefficients are reported.  *pS.05, ** p< .0 1
(see Table 5.5, column 1 vs. 3; Baron & Kenny, 1986). A Sobel test
(1982) confirmed that the interaction effect of difference in attractiveness
and chance on likelihood to act is significantly mediated by importance, z
= 1.92, p = .055.
Discussion
The results of Experiment 5.3 confirm that a manipulation affecting the
use of the sour grapes mechanism affects the inaction inertia effect.
When the use of sour grapes was less necessary, because people expected
to miss the initial opportunity inaction inertia decreased. The results
replicate the findings of Experiment 5.2 that importance mediates the
relation between the manipulations and likelihood to act and that it is not
frustration that is driving the results of Experiment 5.1  and 5.2, but rather
the downgrading of the option under consideration. When frustration was
low, downgrading was made unnecessary and inaction inertia also
decreased. Additionally, they again show a similar pattern of frustration
and likelihood to act, but not of regret and likelihood to act. These results
strongly support the sour grapes explanation of inaction inertia.
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GENERAL DISCUSSION
Can sour grapes explain the inaction inertia effect? That was the central
question under investigation in this chapter. The idea was that having
missed a deal that was much better than the currently offered deal is
frustrating. People downgrade the deal by convincing themselves it is not
such a great deal after all, in order to cope with the frustration resulting
from the difference in attractiveness with the previous opportunity. As a
result, likelihood to act on the current deal increases, revealing inaction
inertia. Three experiments found support for this explanation.
Experiment 5.1 found that thinking about the positive aspects of the
missed opportunity decreases inaction inertia, whereas thinking about the
negative aspects did not influence inaction inertia. This finding indicates
that downgrading  the deal  is part of the explanation of inaction inertia.
Experiment 5.2 found that emphasis of the sweetness of the deal
decreased inaction inertia. Both experiments confirm the prediction that
inaction inertia decreases when downgrading the deal is no longer a
means to undo the frustration associated with missing the first
opportunity. Experiment 5.3 found that inaction inertia decreases when
there was a 90% chance of missing the initial opportunity.  This
experiment shows that it is the downgrading of the deal  as a consequence
of frustration, not the frustration itselfthat causes inaction inertia.  The
results confirmed the prediction that inaction inertia decreases when
frustration about missing the first opportunity is low to begin with and
there is no need to downgrade the opportunity. Clearly, the results are in
favor of inaction inertia as a sour grapes phenomenon.
The results on the frustration measures confirmed the underlying
theory even more. When the sour grapes mechanism is discouraged, as in
Experiments 5.1 and 5.2, frustration levels stay high. When the positive
aspects of the  deal  are made salient, frustration cannot be reduced by
downgrading the deal and therefore stays high. When the expectation of
missing the deal is high, as in Exp. 3, frustration is low. More support for
the underlying theory was provided by the mediations of importance on
likelihood to act.  When the use of the sour grapes mechanism is
hindered, there are no more effects  of the difference in attractiveness
between the missed and the current opportunity on the rated importance
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of the deal. The effects on importance  in turn explained the effects  on
likelihood to act on the current opportunity. Thus, by interfering with the
use  of the sour grapes mechanism, the rated importance of the  deal  was
interfered and that influenced the strength of the inaction inertia effect.
Not only did the manipulations  of the  use  of the sour grapes mechanism
support the sour grapes explanation of inaction inertia, the data also
confirm the underlying process put forward by the theory.
The data show strong evidence that indeed sour grapes can explain
the inaction inertia effect. This provides important answers to earlier
questions about what causes inaction inertia, and why the results on the
devaluation and regret explanations were not completely satisfactory in
this respect. Devaluation apparently occurs for a reason, and it might be
insufficient to see devaluation as an explanation by itself. The comfort it
provides for the frustration that the offer at hand has been much more
attractive is crucial for understanding inaction inertia. The present
research thus provides important insights into why and how devaluation
plays a role in the inaction inertia effect. It would be interesting to further
investigate the role of the sour grapes mechanism on devaluation in price.
In sum, the data reported here investigated the sour grapes
explanation of inaction inertia. The experiments provide support that
inaction inertia is the result of the downgrading of the opportunity to
reduce frustration associated with it because ofthe difference in
attractiveness with the missed opportunity. Therefore it provides
important insights into why devaluation, as found in earlier studies
occurs. Moreover, it provides the new and interesting way to understand
inaction inertia as a sour grapes phenomenon, and that people stay
inactive on sweet deals because they sour them.
Chapter 6
CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION
The aim of this dissertation was to gain knowledge and insight into the
inaction inertia effect. Although the inaction inertia effect was well-
established and seemed to be a robust finding, many questions
concerning its robustness, boundary conditions, causes and consequences
remained. For one, it was unclear when precisely inaction inertia would
occur. Yes, it is a robust phenomenon, but does this mean that every time
we miss an attractive opportunity we are forced to inaction? Aren't
characteristics  of the opportunity itsel f,  or the situation in which the
opportunity mani fests itself important determinants for inaction inertia to
occur? Also, will missing an opportunity cause inaction to everyone to
the same degree? Or are some people more susceptible to the inaction
inertia effect than others?  And if we know all these preconditions,  what
does  it say about the causes  of the inaction inertia effect? Is inaction
inertia a purely reason based, calculative process? Or do feelings have an
important role in this effect, and if so, which feelings come into play? All
these question formed the basis of this project,  and this dissertation
contains the research designed to answer these questions.
I started with studying the boundary conditions of inaction inertia. In
the typical inaction inertia study there is one single opportunity that is
missed and one single opportunity that is subsequently offered. Chapter 2
investigated what the effect of the presence of multiple options during the
decision process on inaction inertia was. The results showed that inaction
inertia decreases when there are more options available to choose from.
Thus, inaction inertia typically occurs when there is one missed and one
current opportunity. The results of Chapter 2 show that when other
options are available, there is less focus on the missed opportunity and
the likelihood to act on a current option is higher than when only one
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option is available. This decrease of focus on the missed opportunity
when multiple options are available is illustrated by the finding that
multiple missed options (and thus a decrease in the focus on the missed
opportunity) enhance the inaction inertia effect.  In this case of multiple
missed options, people will be relatively inactive even when the missed
and the current opportunity are not that different in attractiveness. Thus,
multiple options change the focus of decision makers. This finding
illustrates that multiple available options decrease inaction inertia,
because they decrease the strong focus on the missed opportunity.
The second investigation of the boundary conditions of inaction
inertia looked at the association between the missed and the current
opportunity. In typical previous inaction inertia studies, the missed and
the current opportunity are very similar, the one is quickly followed by
the other, and it is always clear that the current opportunity compares
badly to the missed opportunity. Because of these characteristics the two
opportunities might have been highly associated and therefore very easy
to compare. In fact, when two opportunities are as strongly associated as
that, it is almost impossible not to compare them! Chapter 3 showed that
when this association between the missed and the current opportunity is
weak, inaction inertia is less likely to occur. Thus, not all missed
opportunities influence our current decisions. Specifically, the findings
show that inaction inertia decreases when, (a) the information about the
attractiveness of the missed opportunity is unclear, or ambiguous, and
therefore less easy to compare with the attractiveness of the current
opportunity; (b) the missed opportunity was not just one step away, but
an extra decision was necessary to obtain it; and (c) the missed
opportunity is less comparable to the current opportunity. These three
features all decoupled the missed from the current opportunity. As a
result, the decision to act on the current opportunity it is not strongly
associated with the missed opportunity anymore. Because the focus is
more on the current opportunity as such, and not so much on the
difference in attractiveness with the missed opportunity, the inaction
inertia effect decreased.
Some people are better at decoupling past events and present events.
One person might worry about the missed more attractive opportunity
and keep thinking about it for a long time, while another person might
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step over it more quickly and focus on the present opportunity instead.
This individual difference in coping with missed opportunities is well
captured by the distinction between action and state-oriented people
(Kuhl & Beckmann, 1994). Chapter 4 showed that action-oriented
people, who get over negative events relatively quickly, show less
inaction inertia effects than state-oriented people, who keep thinking
about negative events. Moreover, the findings show that action-oriented
people are less influenced by the missed opportunity in their valuation of
the current opportunity than state-oriented people. As a result, action-
oriented people value the current opportunity more than state-oriented
people, and thus are more likely to act on it.
These three chapters clearly show that there are important boundary
conditions, depending on the situation, the characteristics ofthe
opportunities and the person in the situation to elicit the inaction inertia
effect. These chapters indicate implicitly and explicitly that valuation of
the current opportunity plays an important causal role in the inaction
inertia effect. Implicitly, because the missed opportunity will only
influence the perceived attractiveness  of the missed opportunity when
there is a clear focus on the missed opportunity (Chapter 2) and a clear
association between the missed and the current opportunity (Chapter 3).
One might conclude that only then the current opportunity will be
compared to the missed opportunity and only then people will be able to
use the missed opportunity to calculate the value  of the current
opportunity. Explicitly, Chapter 4 indeed shows that action orientation
attenuates inaction inertia through valuation. Based on these findings one
might be tempted to conclude that inaction inertia is nothing more than a
reason based, calculative process, that occurs because the missed
opportunity signals that the current opportunity is too expensive.
It is highly unlikely, however, that inaction inertia is a purely reason
based, calculative process. The literature provides data to support this
claim. For example, inaction inertia decreases when people are
encouraged to think deeply before they decide to act on the current
opportunity (Zeelenberg et al., 2006, Exp. 4). Thus, reasoning decreases
the effect. Also, when the missed opportunity is unavoidable inaction
inertia decreases (Tykocinski & Pittman, 1998). Thus, inaction inertia
seems to be motivated by the wish to avoid the negative feelings
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associated with the missed opportunity. Hence, there is clear evidence
that feelings play an important role in the inaction inertia effect. The
literature has mainly focused on the negative emotion regret. The
explanation is, that people stay inactive on the current opportunity to
avoid further confrontation with the regret over the missed opportunity.
However, recent findings show evidence against an explanation in terms
of regret (Zeelenberg et al., 2006).  But, if negative feelings play an
important role in the inaction inertia, why do we find evidence against a
regret explanation?
Chapter 5 provides another perspective on the inaction inertia effect
that sheds light on these problems. In this Chapter, the idea is tested that
missing a more attractive opportunity leads to the experience of negative
feelings, specifically that missing an attractive opportunity is frustrating.
A way to cope with this type of frustration is to make the object of
frustration less important or less valuable. Thus, devaluation of the
missed opportunity might not merely be a rational part of inaction inertia,
but actually a tool to deal with the emotions that arise in inaction inertia.
The findings of Chapter 5 support this line of reasoning. The results  show
that thinking about the positive aspects of the opportunity increases
frustration and decreases inaction inertia. Likewise, confirming the
attractiveness of the missed opportunity increases frustration and
decreases inaction inertia. When frustration is low, because people expect
to miss the initial opportunity, there is no devaluation and inaction inertia
decreases as well. These findings show a new and interesting explanation
of inaction inertia, and together with previous findings on regret and
valuation, a better and more complete view on the processes that come
into play in the inaction inertia effect.
After having summarized the research presented in this dissertation and
the results that were obtained, let me now return to the what, when, who
and why questions of inaction inertia, that were addressed in the
introduction. The aim of this dissertation was to answer these questions.  I
will address the questions again and relate them to the new insights. I
will start with when who and why and conclude the discussion by
readdressing the fundamental question: What is inaction inertia?
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When?
A clear boundary condition for inaction inertia to occur is that the
comparison  of the current with the missed opportunity should be very
easy. Put differently, when the link between the missed and the current
opportunity is not evident, or the comparison itself is hindered, inaction
inertia will probably not occur. We saw this in Chapter 2, where inaction
inertia decreases when multiple available options divert the focus away
from the missed opportunity and more onto the current opportunities.
Also in Chapter 3, where inaction inertia decreases, when the link, or the
clear association between the current and the missed opportunity is
weakened. And finally in Chapter 4, where inaction inertia decreases
when people have a natural tendency to to get over missed opportunities
relatively quickly, and focus on the present options instead. The findings
of Chapters 2-4 thus show that for inaction inertia to occur there should
be a clear and unmistakable link between the missed and the current
opportunity to ensure that the current opportunity is viewed in the light of
the missed opportunity. Only then will the likelihood to act on the current
opportunity be influenced by the attractiveness of the missed opportunity.
If the link between the missed and the current opportunity should be
that clear for inaction inertia to occur, one might wonder how often
inaction inertia comes about in everyday life? In regular shops there are
usually multiple options to choose from, and especially large discounts
are made special and are thus separated from regular discounts. For
example, especially very attractive opportunities provide a customer card
or coupons to obtain, or they are part of a special theme to celebrate a
store's anniversary or Christmas, typically factors that might blur the
clear link with subsequent options.
Nevertheless, I do think inaction inertia occurs regularly in everyday
life. It will mainly occur in those situations in which opportunities are
offered one at a time, such as in telemarketing, door-to-door sales, or
other, non commercial opportunities, such as in dating, or undertaking
social activities. For example, in my gym I can take aerobics classes at a
very convenient time, but 1 do not because the previous instructor was
much better than the current one. So I end up not taking aerobics lessons
at all. I am convinced that in all these various situations where people
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decide to take an opportunity or not, previous more attractive
opportunities can influence the decision.
1*1107
This dissertation thus shows that inaction inertia occurs when the focus is
on the missed opportunity and when the missed and the current
opportunity are clearly linked to each other. When the focus is less on the
missed opportunity, and more on the current opportunity instead inaction
inertia decreases. As Chapter 4 showed, action-oriented people are better
at this unlinking or decoupling of past events from present events than
state-oriented people, but with the right mindset everybody will be able
to this. Maybe there are other personal differences with the same
tendencies to link or segregate events. For example, people with a high
need for cognition usually like to think problems through and take every
piece of information into account, while people low in need for cognition
take little pleasure in thinking things through and rely more on heuristics,
or other people to make sense of a situation (Cacioppo, Petty, Feinstein,
Blair, & Jarvis, 1996). It is plausible, that, compared to people with a low
need for cognition, people with a higher need for cognition take other
available current opportunities more into account, because they analyze
the decision at hand more thoroughly. Inaction inertia effects should then
be weaker the higher the need for cognition, because by taking more
options into account the relative focus is less on the missed opportunity
and more on the present options instead. The fact that thinking before
deciding to act on the current opportunity decreases inaction inertia
(Zeelenberg et al., 2006; Exp 4) lends some support for this idea.
Whether need for cognition moderates inaction inertia, of course, remains
to be tested.
Why,
Chapter 4 shows that this linking  of the current to the missed opportunity
causes people to use the missed opportunity to estimate the value of the
current opportunity. Because the current opportunity decreases in value
due to the missed opportunity, likelihood to act on the current
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opportunity is low. This provides first insight into the cause ofthe
inaction inertia phenomenon, which seems to depend on the estimated
value of the opportunity due to the attractiveness of the missed
opportunity. But what can we now conclude about the cause of the
inaction inertia phenomenon?
The main questions in the introduction were whether inaction inertia
is a regret effect, or an anchoring effect, or both, or something else.
Throughout this dissertation it became clear that inaction inertia is not a
regret effect, but also not a simple anchoring effect. There is too much
emotion involved for inaction inertia to be a simple anchoring effect, but
given the data from Zeelenberg et al. (2006) and the findings in Chapter
5, regret does not seem to be the emotion people react to. The things we
can conclude are that (a) people do not act on the current opportunity as a
reaction to negative feelings; and (b) people do not act on the current
opportunity because it is devaluated in comparison to the missed
opportunity.
The evidence that inaction inertia stems from a reaction to a negative
feeling comes from the earlier findings by Zeelenberg et al. (2006), that
thinking reduces the inaction inertia effect, and the findings by
Tykocinski and Pittman (1998), that inaction inertia decreases when
confrontation with the missed opportunity is unavoidable. The findings
are  supported by the findings of Chapter 5 that frustration ratings follow
the pattern of difference in attractiveness and that an increased
expectation that the opportunity will be missed decreases inaction inertia.
All these findings show that an important determinant for the effect is the
gut feeling that arises when people find out about the missed opportunity
and thus that inaction inertia cannot be a simple anchoring effect. Still,
there is ample evidence that devaluation is an important determinant for
inaction inertia to occur as well (Arkes et al., 2002; Sevdalis et al., 2006;
Zeelenberg et al., 2006, Chapters 4 & 5). How can these two results be
compatible?
The answer suggested by this dissertation to the question why
inaction inertia happens is that inaction inertia is an effect that is caused
by the downgrading of the current opportunity as a way to cope with the
negative affect caused by comparing it to the missed opportunity.
Therefore, when the comparison with the missed opportunity is hindered,
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there is no need to downgrade the opportunity to cope with any negative
affect. Or, when people get over the missed opportunity quickly, they do
not need to downgrade the opportunity to reduce the experienced
negative affect. That is why devaluation and affect are both necessary. At
the moment, it seems to be the most inclusive and parsimonious
explanation of inaction inertia.
What?
After all these new insights into the inaction inertia effect, now is the
right time to readdress the question that started the introduction: What is
inaction inertia? The initial definition of inaction inertia was: "Inaction
inertia occurs when bypassing an initial action opportunity has the effect
of decreasing the likelihood that subsequent similar action opportunities
will be taken" (Tykocinski et al., 1995, p. 794). With all the knowledge
on inaction inertia that has accumulated over the last years, this definition
may need to be refined. First, as already explained in the introduction,
inaction inertia only occurs when the initial opportunity is much more
attractive than the subsequent similar action opportunity. When there is
only a small difference in attractiveness, inaction inertia does not occur.
Second, as became clear throughout this dissertation, the subsequent
action opportunity should not just be similar, but strongly associated to
the missed opportunity. When people focus on the current opportunity
and the  link with the missed opportunity is weakened because of the
situation or their personal inclination to do  so, the comparison  of the
current opportunity with the missed opportunity is less obvious and
inaction inertia does not occur. This strong association is not just caused
by similarity of the two opportunities, but also by other coupling factors
and a one-to-one association. Therefore, the definition of inaction inertia
might also include that difference in attractiveness between the missed
and the current opportunity and the association between the initial and
the current opportunity are crucial elements for inaction inertia to occur.
The most important contribution of this dissertation is the idea that
inaction inertia is an effect of downgrading the opportunity as a reaction
to the negative affect evoked by the comparison with the initial
opportunity. Up till now explanations of inaction inertia in terms of
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downgrading the current opportunity and the avoidance of negative affect
were mainly discussed as two separate processes, that might co-occur
(e.g., Arkes et al., 2002; Sevdalis et al., 2006). Chapter 5 in this
dissertation is the first research to demonstrate that these processes are
linked, by showing that factors that increase frustration reduce the
downgrading of the current opportunity.
Based on the knowledge we gained over the years, including in this
dissertation, I conclude that inaction inertia occurs when people stay
inactive with respect to an attractive opportunity because it is strongly
associated with a much more attractive opportunity. As long as the
association with the initial opportunity elicits bitter feelings that lead to
the downgrading of the current opportunity, inaction inertia will occur.
This implies that for inaction inertia to occur the initial opportunity does
not necessarily need to be missed. Expecting a much more attractive
opportunity, because of a typing error in the ad for example might (and
can, see Tykocinski & Pittman, 2001, Exp. 2) also induce inaction
inertia. Because the current opportunity is associated with a more
attractive expected opportunity, the comparison (and hence the following
bitterness and downgrading) will probably still take place. Note, that this
goes  against an explanation in terms of regret, which would predict the
opposite, namely that missing an opportunity is crucial for inaction
inertia to occur. Instead, I believe ifthere is a strong link with a more
attractive opportunity and that link elicits the same downgrading of the
current opportunity as the missed opportunities have in previous studies,
inaction inertia will occur. These are untested hypotheses. Therefore,
future research should investigate whether inaction inertia also occurs in
these situations.
REGULATING INERTIA
Having a clear perception  of what inaction inertia is, enables us to think
about how to prevent inertia from setting in. You might be in a situation
in which you want to avoid falling prey to the inaction inertia effect. For
instance, I am inert when it comes to taking aerobics classes, because the
classes used to be better before. If I do want to get into shape by taking
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aerobics lessons, now I know how to avoid making the comparison with
that other teacher and keep my focus on the present teacher instead. For
example, 1 can compare the course to the spinning class around the same
time, where the teacher always yells that you are not good enough. Now
all of a sudden the aerobics lessons look much better!
Besides preventing inaction inertia in situations where the decision
maker wants to avoid doing nothing, for marketers it is of course
important to prevent inaction inertia in their customers. Introducing big
promotions might increase sales and attract new customers, but in the
long run it might decrease sales, because people do not want to act on an
opportunity when it was more attractive before. One obvious solution to
prevent inaction inertia in customers is for marketers to keep the
differences in attractiveness between promotions and regular prices
small.  I f they do want to attract more customers and increase their
promotions, it is good to segregate the regular price from the previous
promotion and keep the focus away from the previous large promotion.
This dissertation outlines a few ways to do this. For example, make
sure the product is on display next to other similar products and that the
regular price still looks attractive next to the other products on the shelf.
Or offer the big promotion with coupons or customer cards, such that the
current price is segregated from the previous one, because it took more
steps to get it. Highlighting the incomparability of the previous
opportunity to the regular price might also help. A way to do this is by
putting the big promotion in another less comparable product category
than it is regularly in (e.g., in supermarkets special sales are often placed
on separate shelves, or separate baskets). This way the product changes
from the category "cookies" to the category "products on sale", and the
next week it is compared less to the previous promotion when it is back
in the "cookies" category. Another way to make the big promotion less
comparable to the regular sales is by making the promotion unique (cf.,
Zeelenberg et al., 2006), for example because it is part of a special theme.
Because of its uniqueness it is different from other sales and thus less
comparable to other sales.
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FUTURE RESEARCH
Inaction inertia and regret
Based on this dissertation, one might conclude that regret plays no role
whatsoever in the inaction inertia effect. In both Chapter 4 and 5 regret
did not cause inaction inertia. Undoubtedly, regret is present when
inaction inertia occurs. It signals that indeed a more attractive
opportunity was missed and that people feel stupid for letting that happen
(Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2007). However, the data from Chapter 5 and the
data from Zeelenberg et al. (2006) showed that the fact that it is present
does not automatically mean that it has a causal effect. Thus, the regret of
missing the more attractive opportunity, or the memory of it when
deciding about the subsequent opportunity is not causal for inaction
inertia. People will probably anticipate regret when they imagine
themselves acting on the current opportunity. But the question remains to
what extent this is causal to the inaction inertia effect. Zeelenberg et al.
(2006) proposed that anticipated regret  is a consequence  of the
downgrading of the opportunity. People will probably expect to regret
acting on the opportunity when they just downgraded it for the sake of
comfort. Although Zeelenberg et al. (2006) report correlations that
support this claim, this question still needs to be investigated empirically.
Inertia or switching?
The inaction inertia research discussed so far might give the impression
that inaction inertia is just a matter of acting on the opportunity or staying
passive. However, when there are multiple options to choose from,
people might also switch to another option in the choice set (Zeelenberg
& Van Putten, 2005). Based on the findings concerning the when
question, this dissertation can provide two motivations for switching.
One comes from Chapter 2, that people focus less on the missed
opportunity and more on the current options instead. An obvious
motivation to switch is that people choose the most attractive option from
the current choice set, which happens to be another option than the
previously more attractive option. Another motivation might be, that
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switching is a way of actively decoupling the current from the missed
opportunity. Because Chapter 3 showed that inaction inertia decreases
when the missed opportunity is less comparable to the current
opportunity, it might be that people switch to another option in the choice
set to actively decrease the comparability of the current opportunity.
People might be motivated to break the link between the current and the
missed opportunity because they will anticipate more pleasure with their
action than when the same opportunity is chosen. It remains speculation
if this second motivation for switching is valid. Research should give
more insight into this question.
Inertia and the sunk cost effect
In the introduction, inaction inertia was linked to the effects of prior
actions that stimulate people to take action are well known. For example
the sunk cost effect, that people are more likely to invest in a failing
course of action, when they invested in that action earlier (e.g., the costly
Dutch railway known as the Betuwelijn; Arkes & Blumer, 1985).
Inaction inertia is similar to the sunk cost effect, because it also describes
that past decisions influence current decisions. The findings of this
dissertation could be therefore insightful to the sunk cost effect as well.
The Betuwelijn is a great example of the sunk cost effect. The budget
for the railway was estimated on approximately €2.5 billions, now the
costs have accumulated to €4.7 billions. Only a couple of trains have
actually used the railway. Traffic has been put to a halt due to several
malfunctions. Still the Dutch government insisted on finishing the
project. The following (taken from a webpage on the Betuwelijn and
translated from Dutch; Wikipedia, October 3,2007
http://nl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Betuweroute) illustrates this irrational
decision:
The Betuwelijn has been under pressure since the
beginning of the studies. Many people, including
renowned and independent experts, seriously doubt
whether the railway will be profitable. Inland
shipping would be cheaper and the capacity of
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inland shipping would be easy to expand. Still, the
government has agreed upon continuing the project,
despite consistent criticism from science as well as
society.
Why would a government decide to keep investing in a project that is
clearly not profitable? The answer to this question based on sunk cost
research is simple, namely because the government already invested so
much in it earlier and they do not want to waste these earlier investments
(Arkes & Ayton, 1999; Arkes & Blumer, 1985). How could such a losing
course of action, which clearly had and still has great consequences  for
Dutch society (financially, and environmentally) been prevented?
This dissertation might give a couple of suggestions on how to
prevent the sunk cost effect. First, because like the inaction inertia effect,
it describes that past decisions influence current decisions, the sunk cost
effect might be prevented by focusing on multiple current available
investments. The Dutch government might have stopped and put this
project next to other projects, such as education, inland shipping, or the
health care system. Then they might have stopped investing money in the
railway and invest in one of these other projects.
Second, the sunk cost effect could be prevented by decoupling the
sunk cost from the current decision to invest in the project. When the
costs already made in the project are ambiguous, and thus less likely to
be coupled to the current decision to invest or not, the sunk cost effect
disappears (Van Dijk & Zeelenberg, 2003). Thus, when the government
was not given a strict amount of expenditures already made, but more an
estimate between €2.5 and €3.5 billion, their tendency to further invest
in the railway could have been prevented. Other ways to decouple the
sunk costs from the current investment decision might have been to make
the investments less comparable. By framing both the costs as general
investments in the Betuwelijn they are much easier to compare than
when they are framed in more detail (Johnson,  1984), for example i f the
earlier investment was seen as costs for preparing the site for building,
and the other investment in costs for material.
Third, the sunk cost effect might be prevented by activating an
action-oriented mindset. Remember that action-oriented people show
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weaker inaction inertia effects than state-oriented people, because action-
oriented people use the missed opportunity less to value the current
opportunity than state-oriented people (Chapter 4). One might get the
impression that action-oriented people are more active in general,
because they get over past events more quickly and focus on how to
improve the present. However,  i f action-oriented people also get over
sunk costs more quickly than state-oriented people, they should be less
likely to invest in more  in the project. Probably,  if the Dutch government
focused less on already incurred costs and was more focused on the
current situation and what is the best strategy to optimize the present
instead, the investments in the Betuwelijn would not have been nearly
twice as much as estimated. Thus, by studying inaction inertia new ideas
for research in other fields emerged as well. Maybe if these ideas can be
generalized to the sunk cost effect, they might also be to other sequential
decision phenomena, such as the door-in-the-face technique (Cialdini et
al., 1975), or the foot-in-the-door technique (Freedman & Fraser, 1966).
At the end...
At the end of this dissertation I  look back at it with great satisfaction. The
research conducted  over the last couple of years brought about important
insights into when, to whom, and why inaction inertia occurs. These
insights contribute to our understanding of the causes and boundary
conditions  of the inaction inertia effect, and thereby of our understanding
what inaction inertia is. Moreover, these insights led to new ideas and
new insights that can inspire others (and myself) to take new research
venues. Not just in the field of inaction inertia, but also more generally in
the field of sequential decision making. Of course, there are other paths I
could have chosen, that might have led to an even better understanding of
inaction inertia. As frustrating as this thought might sound, let us not
trivialize the content of this book. After all, if I had chosen to pursue a
career in customer care service (my job-on-the-side during college), this
book would have never even existed! I am happy I chose the scientific
road and studied inaction inertia, because now I have more insight in how
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Het doel van dit proefschrift was het krijgen van kennis over en inzicht in
het inactie inertie effect. Het inactie inertie effect houdt in dat mensen
minder geneigd zijn in te gaan op een aantrekkelijke aanbieding als ze
eerder een veel aantrekkelijkere aanbieding hebben gemist (Tykocinski,
Pittman, & Tuttle, 1995). Wanneer mensen bijvoorbeeld een aanbieding
op een vakantie zien van €1000 voor €900, zijn ze over het algemeen
minder geneigd de reis te boeken wanneer de vakantie een week eerder
€400 kostte dan wanneer er geen eerdere aanbieding was. Hoe
aantrekkelijker de gemiste aanbieding, hoe minder geneigd men is op de
huidige aanbieding in te gaan. Het inactie inertie effect is inmiddels goed
gefundeerd en het lijkt een robuuste bevinding te zijn. Toch bleven er
vragen bestaan over de robuustheid, de grensvoorwaarden, oorzaak en
gevolgen. Het was bijvoorbeeld onduidelijk wanneer het effect precies
zou optreden. Omdat het een robuuste bevinding is, betekent dit dat
telkens wanneer we een mooie kans mislopen we gedwongen worden tot
een staat van inactie? Zijn er geen kenmerken van de aanbieding, of de
situatie waarin deze zich voordoet die bepalen of inactie inertie optreedt
of niet? En zal het missen van een mooie aanbieding het gedrag van
iedereen hetzelfde beinvloeden? Of zijn sommige mensen vatbaarder
voor het inactie inertie effect dan anderen? En als we al deze
voorwaarden voor het inactie inertie effect weten, wat vertelt ons dat
over de oorzaak van het effect? Is inactie inertie een effect dat gebaseerd
is op puur beredeneerde en calculerende processen, of spelen gevoelens
een belangrijke rol bij het veroorzaken van inactie inertie? Al deze
vragen vormden de basis van mijn onderzoeksproject en dit proefschrift
is geschreven om deze vragen zo goed mogelijk te beantwoorden.
Ik ben begonnen met het bestuderen van de grensvoorwaarden van
inactie inertie. In de typische inactie inertie studie is er den gemiste
aanbieding en wordt er vervolgens 66n andere aanbieding aangeboden. In
Hoofdstuk 2 werd onderzocht wat het effect is van het aanbieden van
meerdere opties tijdens de besluitvorming op het inactie inertie effect. De
resultaten lieten zien, dat inactie inertie afneemt wanneer er meerdere
huidige opties zijn waaruit men kan kiezen. Inactie inertie komt dus
typisch voor wanneer er een gemiste en een huidige aanbieding zijn
aangeboden. Hoofdstuk 2 laat zien dat wanneer er meerdere opties
beschikbaar zijn de aandacht van de gemiste aanbieding afgaat en het
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vervolgens waarschijnlijker wordt dat een optie wordt gekozen dan
wanneer 66n optie aangeboden wordt. Dat meerdere huidige opties de
aandacht afleiden van de gemiste aanbieding wordt gerllustreerd met de
bevinding dat meerdere gemiste opties (en dus een grotere aandacht voor
het gemiste) het inactie inertie effect versterken. In het geval van
meerdere gemiste opties zijn mensen namelijk inactiever dan wanneer er
66n gemiste aanbieding was, zelfs wanneer er een klein verschil in
aantrekkelijkheid is tussen de gemiste en de huidige aanbiedingen.
Meerdere opties richten dus de aandacht van de besluitnemers juist op de
gemiste aanbieding ofjuist ervan af.
Het tweede onderzoek naar de grensvoorwaarden van inactie inertie
keek naar de associatie tussen de gemiste en de huidige aanbieding. In
typische inactie inertie studies tot nu toe leken de gemiste en de huidige
aanbieding erg op elkaar, de huidige volgde altijd snel op de gemiste
aanbieding en het was altijd heel erg duidelijk dat de huidige aanbieding
slecht was vergeleken met de gemiste aanbieding. Vanwege deze
eigenschappen van de twee aanbiedingen zou het kunnen zijn dat ze sterk
geassocieerd zijn met elkaar en daarom erg makkelijk te vergelijken.
Sterker nog, als twee aanbiedingen zo sterk geassocieerd zijn met elkaar
is het bijna onmogelijk om ze niet met elkaar te vergelijken! Hoofdstuk 3
liet zien dat wanneer de associatie tussen de twee aanbiedingen minder
sterk is, inactie inertie ook afneemt. Niet alle gemiste aanbiedingen
beinvloeden dus onze beslissingen. De resultaten laten specifiek zien, dat
inactie inertie afneemt wanneer (a) de informatie over de
aantrekkelijkheid van de gemiste aanbieding onzeker, of ambigu is, en
daarom moeilijker te vergelijken met de aantrekkelijkheid van de huidige
aanbieding; (b) de gemiste aanbieding niet 6En stap verwijderd is van de
huidige aanbieding, maar dat er meerdere besluiten nodig waren om de
gemiste aanbieding te krijgen; en (c) de gemiste aanbieding minder
vergelijkbaar is met de huidige aanbieding. Deze drie kenmerken
ontkoppelden de gemiste van de huidige aanbieding, waardoor het besluit
de huidige aanbieding wel of niet te nemen minder geassocieerd werd
met de gemiste aanbieding. Inactie inertie nam af, omdat de aandacht
meer bij de huidige aanbieding lag en niet meer zozeer op het verschil in
aantrekkelijkheid met de gemiste aanbieding.
Sommige mensen zijn beter in het ontkoppelen van eerdere
gebeurtenissen van huidige gebeurtenissen. De ene persoon kan zich heel
erg druk maken om gemiste aanbiedingen en blijft hierover piekeren,
terwijl de andere persoon er makkelijker overheen stapt en zich meer
richt op het hier en nu. Dit individuele verschil in het omgaan met
gemiste aanbiedingen wordt goed vastgelegd met het onderscheid van
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mensen met een actie of een toestand orientatie (Kuhl & Beckmann,
1994). Hoofdstuk 4 liet zien dat actie georienteerde mensen, die relatief
snel over gemiste aanbiedingen heen stappen, minder het inactie inertie
effect vertonen dan mensen met een toestand orientatie, die blijven
piekeren over *emiste aanbiedingen. Bovendien lieten de resultaten zien
dat actie georienteerde mensen minder worden beinvloed door de gemiste
aanbieding bij het op waarde schatten van de huidige aanbieding dan
toestand georienteerde mensen. Hierdoor schatten de actie georienteerde
mensen de huidige aanbieding op hogere waarde dan toestand
georienteerde mensen en zijn daarom eerder geneigd op de aanbieding in
te gaan.
Deze 3 hoofdstukken laten dus duidelijke grensvoorwaarden zien
voor het inactie inertie effect, afhankelijk van de situatie, de kenmerken
van de aanbiedingen en persoonlijkheid. Zowel impliciet als expliciet
tonen deze hoofdstukken aan dat de waardeschatting van de huidige
aanbieding een belangrijke rol speelt in het veroorzaken van het inactie
inertie effect. Impliciet, omdat de gemiste aanbieding de vermeende
aantrekkelijkheid van de huidige aanbieding alleen beinvloedt wanneer
de aandacht sterk op de gemiste aanbieding ligt (Hoofdstuk 2) en er een
sterke associatie is tussen de gemiste en de huidige aanbieding
(Hoofdstuk 3). Je zou hieruit kunnen concluderen dat alleen in die
omstandigheden de huidige aanbieding met de gemiste aanbieding wordt
vergeleken en dat dus daarom mensen in staat zijn om de gemiste
aanbieding te gebruiken om de waarde van de huidige aanbieding te
berekenen. Expliciet, omdat Hoofdstuk 4 daadwerkelijk laat zien dat de
waardeschatting leidt tot inactie inertie voor toestand, maar niet voor
actie georienteerde mensen. Gebaseerd op deze resultaten kunnen we tot
de verleiding komen om te concluderen dat inactie inertie een puur
berekend en beredeneerd proces is, waarbij de gemiste aanbieding
signaleert dat de huidige aanbieding simpelweg te duur is.
Toch is het hoogst onwaarschijnlijk dat inactie inertie een puur
beredeneerd rekeneffect is. De literatuur ondersteunt deze gedachte. Zo
vermindert inactie inertie wanneer mensen worden aangespoord goed na
te denken over hun beslissing de huidige aanbieding te pakken of niet
(Zeelenberg et al., 2006, Exp. 4). Nadenken vermindert dus juist het
inactie inertie effect. Een ander punt is dat inactie inertie verdwijnt
wanneer de gemiste aanbieding onvermijdbaar is (Tykocinski & Pittman,
1998). Kennelijk wordt inactie inertie gemotiveerd door de wens de
negatieve gevoelens die gepaard gaan met de gemiste aanbieding te
vermijden. Gevoelens spelen dus duidelijk een belangrijke rol in het
veroorzaken van inactie inertie. De literatuur concentreert zich tot nu toe
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voornamelijk op de emotie spijt. De verklaring is dat mensen niet op de
huidige aanbieding ingaan, om niet verder geconfronteerd te hoeven
worden met hun spijt over de gemiste aanbieding. Recentelijk onderzoek
laat echter sterk bewijs zien tegen een verklaring in termen van spijt
(Zeelenberg et al., 2006). De vraag blijft nu, als negatieve gevoelens zo'n
belangrijke rol in het inactie inertie effect spelen, waarom vinden we dan
bewijs tegen een verklaring in termen van spijt?
Hoofdstuk 5 biedt een ander perspectief op het inactie inertie effect
dat haar licht laat schijnen over deze problemen. In dit hoofdstuk wordt
het idee getest dat het missen van een eerdere aanbieding leidt tot
negatieve gevoelens, meer specifiek dat het frustrerend is. Een manier
om met deze frustratie om te gaan is door het frustrerende object (in dit
geval de gemiste aanbieding) minder belangrijk of minder waardevol te
maken. De lagere waardeschatting in het inactie inertie effect zou dus
niet een rekenproces kunnen zijn, maar een manier om met de emoties
die opspelen bij inactie inertie om te gaan. De resultaten van Hoofdstuk 5
steunen deze redenering. De resultaten laten zien dat het nadenken over
de positieve aspecten van de gemiste aanbieding frustratie verhogen en
inactie inertie verminderen. Ook het benadrukken van de
aantrekkelijkheid van de aanbieding verhoogt frustratie en vermindert
inactie inertie. Tot slot is de frustratie laag wanneer men verwacht de
aanbieding te zullen missen en er geen verlaagde waardeschatting nodig
meer is om met de frustratie om te gaan. Dit onderzoek laat een nieuwe
interessante verklaring van inactie inertie zien en samen met de eerdere
bevindingen ten aanzien van spijt en waardeschatting geeft dit onderzoek
een beter en meer complete kijk op de processen die ten grondslag liggen
aan het inactie inertie effect.
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